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COMMENT
The Incompatibility of Copyright and Computer Software:
An Economic Evaluation and a Proposal for a
Marketplace Solution*
Since the advent of the computer age the legal community has been seeking,
pondering, and debating ways in which to group, define, and protect a form of
intellectual property commonly called computer software.' Revisions to the
Copyright Act2 and the decision in Apple Computer, Inc. v. Franklin Computer
Corp. 3 and its progeny firmly place the bulk of software protection in the copy-
right domain.4 Nevertheless, the reliance on copyright law as applied to this
particular form of intellectual property has become destructive to the competi-
tive process in the software industry.
Because copyright law was not originally designed to protect computer-
related property, the courts have had to struggle with semantics, battle with
well-settled copyright precedent, and grapple with the wording of the copyright
statute and its legislative history to mold copyright law into society's protective
device for software property. The Apple decision and subsequent cases identified
the scope of such protection for literal, verbatim copies of computer programs.
The United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit delivered a landmark
opinion in Whelan Associates v. Jaslow Dental Laboratories,5 expanding the
scope of copyright protection from the literal, identical copying of a program's
code to the copying of its structure, sequence, and organization. This expansion
distorts copyright law by failing to adhere to a crucial principle: copyright pro-
tection extends only to the expression and not to the idea expressed. 6 Unfortu-
nately, the Whelan court could achieve equitable results only by an incorrect
application of copyright law.
Recent court decisions have extended protection beyond the underlying
software code to the literal elements of a program's executable image, commonly
* Portions of this Comment are derived from the author's prize-winning entry in the 1987
Nathan Burton Memorial Competition.
1. In a market economy, to facilitate effective and efficient allocation of scarce resources, it is
necessary to grant individuals exclusive property rights. See Demsetz, Toward a Theory of Property
Rights, 57 AM. ECON. REv. 347 (1967).
2. Pub. L. No. 94-553, 90 Stat. 2541 (1976) (codified at 17 U.S.C. §§ 101-810); see infra notes
34-50 and accompanying text.
3. 714 F.2d 1240 (3d Cir. 1983), cert. dismissed, 464 U.S. 1033 (1984); see infra notes 183-86
and accompanying text.
4. The majority of the legal community believes that copyright protection of software is effec-
tive. See Baumgarten & Meyer, Program Copyright And the Office of Technology Assessment (part
1), COMPUTER LAW., Oct. 1987, at 8; Mantle, Trade Secret and Copyright Protection of Computer
Software, 4 COMPUTER L.J. 669 (1984).
5. 797 F.2d 1222 (3d Cir. 1986), cerL denied, 107 S. Ct. 877 (1987); see infra notes 62-78 and
accompanying text.
6. Commonly referred to as the "idea-expression" dichotomy, this is a basic principle of copy-
right law. 17 U.S.C. § 102(b) (1982).
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called the program's "look and feel" or user interface.7 In this situation a cor-
rect application of copyright law leads to anticompetitive results. The first de-
veloper of successful software who is able to set an industry standard may now
use the copyright law as a shield against competitive market forces. Because
copyright law and software are incompatible, this Comment suggests that copy-
right protection for computer software be abandoned.
Part I reviews the history of copyright protection as applied to computer
software and then examines the effect of recent copyright decisions on the com-
petitive process. Further, it examines the incompatibility between copyright
protection and a socially desirable economic and competitive result in the com-
puter software industry. Part II recommends that Congress, courts, and
software developers place the onus of protection on the marketplace by encour-
aging use of contract law, complemented by trademark and trade secret law.
Moreover, for those circumstances that fall through the cracks of these estab-
lished bodies of law, Congress should adopt a federal law of misappropriation, a
catch-all category that would preserve a first developer's legitimate lead time
and thereby provide the finishing touch to a complete scheme of software protec-
tion. This solution would protect both the idea and the expression of software,
but only for a time that would be determined by market forces. Courts would
then be free to render equitable and procompetitive decisions without distorting
a body of law that is il-suited for the task of software protection.
Before examining the basics of copyright law as applied to software, an
examination of the economic and constitutional objectives of an effective scheme
of legal protection is useful.8 First, the plan should provide the economic incen-
tive needed to stimulate innovation and creativity in the computer software in-
dustry. This can be accomplished by allowing individuals to achieve either
monetary or other personal gain, commensurate with the creativity involved, as
measured by the software's usefulness to society. 9 The plan must therefore pro-
tect intellectual endeavors by preventing others from benefiting from the crea-
tor's innovations. This reward for innovation, however, must be tempered by
society's desire to promote further innovation and competition. New ideas must
be disseminated throughout society so that further progress can be made with-
out having to reinvent the wheel. 10 The preservation of competition in the mar-
7. See Waldman, Software-Copyright Laws Are in State of Confusion, Wall Street Journal,
March 21, 1988, at 23 col.4.
8. The economic goals expressed in this Comment are not universally accepted by lawyers and
economists, but evince this author's views on objectives that should be followed while searching for
an optimal scheme of legal protection. A debate or comparison of the various schools of thought is
beyond the scope of this Comment. For a review of the conflicting economic views on granting
monopoly rights to inventors, see Machlup, An Economic Review of the Patent System, Study No. 15,
Subcommittee on Patents, Trademarks and Copyrights, Senate Committee on the Judiciary, 85th
Cong., 2d Sess. (1958), reprinted in P. GOLDsTEIN, COPYRIGHT, PATENT, TRADEMARK AND RE-
LATED STATE DocTRINES 16-19 (2d ed. 1981).
9. See, e-g., Mazer v. Stein, 347 U.S. 201, 219 (1954) (discusses the economic philosophy be-
hind intellectual property protection).
10. Even Sir Isaac Newton realized the importance of building on the work of his predecessors.
He has been quoted as proclaiming, "[I]f I had seen farther than other men, it was because I had
stood on the shoulders of giants." Whelan Assoc. v. Jaslow Dental Laboratories, 797 F.2d 1222,
1238 n.33 (3d Cir. 1986), cert. denied, 107 S. Ct. 877 (1987).
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ketplace is desirable to keep consumer prices down, quality high, and to trigger
innovation and technological advancements; therefore, it would be inefficient to
allow software developers to secure greater monopoly profits than is necessary to
stimulate creativity and innovation." Second, the plan must comply with the
guideline set forth by the United States Constitution that empowers Congress
"[t]o Promote the Progress of Science and useful Arts, by securing for limited
time to authors and inventors the exclusive right to their respective writings and
discoveries." 12
I. THE EVOLUTION OF COPYRIGHT PROTECTION FOR SOFrWARE
Computers were first developed in the 1940s, but these early computers
were programmed by the setting of electrical switches by hand.13 In the 1950s
and 1960s programmers began writing programs in source code to automate the
manual switching task, but software misappropriation was not yet a problem
because most programs were custom-developed to meet the needs of individual
users, and the software was packaged and sold with the computer hardware. 14
Additionally, these big computers were affordable only to businesses and institu-
tions with sufficient financial resources to purchase and maintain the machines.
With the advent of semiconductor technology in the 1970s came the prob-
lem of software misappropriation. Microcomputers became affordable to small
11. See Hirshleifer, The Private and Social Value of Information and the Reward to Inventive
Activity, 61 AM. ECON. REv. 561 (1971).
"The advantages arising from a system of copyright are obvious. It is desirable that
we should have a supply of good books: we cannot have such a supply unless men of letters
are liberally remunerated....
... [Tihe least exceptionable way of remunerating them is by a monopoly. Yet monopoly
is an evil. For the sake of the good we must submit to the evil; but the evil ought not to last
a day longer than is necessary for the purpose of securing the good."
Baird, Common Law Intellectual Property and the Legacy of International News Service v. Associ-
ated Press, 50 U. CHI. L. REv. 411, 416 n.15 (1983) (quoting Macaulay, Copyright (pt. I), in PROSE
AND POETRY 731, 733-35 (G. Young ed. 1952)).
12. U.S. CONST., art. I, § 8, cl. 8.
13. See Wharton, Use and Expression: The Scope of Copyright Protection for Computer Pro-
grams, 5 COMPUTER L.J. 433 (1985).
14. A programmer initially writes the software in a source code, which contains words within
programming statements often equivalent to English (eg., "begin" or "while"). An entire statement
or instruction may contain, for example; "While X < 100 Do," or "IF X > Y GOTO 50." The
source code may be in one of several languages, such as COBOL, FORTRAN, BASIC, Pascal, C, or
EDL. Programmers use different languages often depending on the type of application program they
are writing. For example, the acronym "COBOL" stands for "COmmon Business Oriented Lan-
guage" and is used in many business environments; "FORTRAN" stands for "FORmula TRANsla-
tion" and is commonly used for scientific applications; and "BASIC" refers to "Beginners All-
purpose Symbolic Instruction Code" and is commonly the language used in schools to teach the
fundamentals of computer programming. The source code can then be edited much like one would
edit existing text in a word processor. Once the program is written in source code, it is then auto-
matically translated by the computer into object code, or machine language, which is a binary code
of "0"s and "l"s that represent low and high voltages and that tells the hardware in the computer
whether to turn switches or gates "on" or "off." Instead of hand-setting electrical switches as was
done in the 1940s, this is now done by the software, a term that may include either the source code
or the object code, but only object code actually directs the computer to perform functions.
For more information outlining the computing process, see L. DICKEY, INTRODUCTION TO
COMPUTER CONCEPTS HARDVARE AND SOFTWARE (1974); see also Appendix to this Comment.
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businesses and to home users. Various vendors produced microcomputers that
would run the same software. These hardware advances led to entry into the
market by individual software producers who wanted to take advantage of the
high demand for programs that would do everything from word processing to
spread sheet calculations. By the beginning of the 1970s, an estimated 10,000
computer programs were being written each day. 15 Vendors began mass mar-
keting programs stored on a machine readable medium, such as floppy disks, to
users worldwide. The problem of misappropriation surfaced when consumers
soon found it very profitable, convenient, and easy to copy software written by
others rather than purchase an authorized copy. 16 Some competitors also began
taking copied software and selling it, or passing it off as their own.1 7
As the value to society of computer software rapidly increased, so came the
plea for protection from its piracy.' 8 Before determining the most effective
method of protecting computer programs, the legislature and courts were con-
fronted with the problem of how this new form of property should be catego-
rized and defined. The legal community had to decide whether software should
be copyrighted like a book or patented like a machine.' 9
To better understand this dilemma and the complexity of the problem, con-
sider the following: A program is designed to solve a particular problem. An
applications program, which tells the computer how to execute specific functions
such as word processing and spread sheet calculations, begins as an algorithm,
recipe, or flow chart. Usually first written in the vernacular, these procedures
are then coded into a programming language such as COBOL, Pascal, or FOR-
TRAN, commonly referred to as the source code.20 The source program is au-
tomatically translated by the computer into object code, which is a binary
15. Milgrim, Proprietary Rights in Software, COMPUTER LITIGATION 1985 TRIAL TACTICS
AND TECHNIQUES 15, 17 (1985) (citing Koller, Computing Software Protection: Report of an Indus-
try Clinic, 13 IDEA 351, 361 (1970)).
16. Copying a program stored on a floppy disk to another floppy can usually be accomplished
in a matter of seconds at a cost of under $2.00 (the cost of the blank floppy). Today it is estimated
that, excluding backups, for every legitimate copy of a computer program there exists an unauthor-
ized copy. See Berkin, A Look at Software Piracy-1987, COMPUTER LAW., Sept. 1987, at 11.
Computer crime's harmless image has probably been enhanced because until recently our soci-
ety did not portray computer pirates in a bad light. Popular movies applaud computer criminals
instead of chastising them. In one recent film, "War Games," the hero improves his mediocre high
school grades by accessing and manipulating the school's computer system. The news media also
has lauded computer criminals. The term "computer piracy," first embraced by the media, gives
these criminals a certain Robin Hood attractiveness. Society in general seems delighted with the fact
that computers are not yet a substitute for swashbuckling human ingenuity. See Pender, Perspectives
on Computer Ethics and Crime, 36 BUSINESS 30 (1986).
17. Sometimes piracy takes the form of copying a program stored on cassette tape, floppy disk,
hard disk, or some other external memory device. However, some programs are stored on a silicon
chip, known as a ROM (read only memory) chip. Everyday users do not copy programs from such a
device, but experts can copy programs from this chip. See, e.g., Apple Computer, Inc. v. Franklin
Computer Corp., 714 F.2d 1240, 1249 (3d Cir. 1983) (holding that programs stored in ROM are
copyrightable), cert. dismissed, 464 U.S. 1033 (1984).
18. See, eg., Parker v. Flook, 437 U.S. 584, 587 n.7 (1978) (Court observed that by 1976 the
value of software in our society exceeded $43 billion).
19. Although other forms of protection, such as trade secret and trademark law, are being used
to protect software (see sources listed infra note 161), the legal community chose to group this form
of intellectual property under one of the traditional headings of "patent" or "copyright."
20. See supra note 14 and accompanying text.
[Vol. 66
COPYRIGHT OF COMPUTER SOFTWARE
representation ("l"s and "10"s).21 This machine language instructs the hardware
when to turn internal switches on ("1") and off ("0") within the computer.
This program, the creative solution to a problem, is first expressed in the
English language and eventually expressed as electrical signals. A program may
be grouped and defined in several ways because it changes form several times
during its existence. At its two highest levels, the flow chart and source code,
the program is a readable expression and one might therefore assume that it
should be copyrighted like a book. At its lowest level, the machine language,
one might suggest that software be patented like a machine.
Patent law protects "any new and useful process, machine, manufacture, or
composition of matter, or any new and useful improvement thereof."' 22 The
owner of a patent is granted a monopoly over the use, manufacture, and sale of
the invention for the statutory period of seventeen years and is protected against
independent discovery.23 Obtaining a patent is usually a long, laborious, and
expensive process, often taking three to five years. Moreover, the patent appli-
cant must meet stringent tests of usefulness, 24 novelty,25 and non-obviousness. 26
As the quid pro quo for the grant of the patent monopoly, the inventor is re-
quired to make a full disclosure of the work to the public. 27
The patentability of computer programs has been rigorously debated by
legal scholars and the courts. 28 A well-settled principle in patent law is that
laws of nature, mathematical formulas, abstract ideas, or other fundamental
truths are not patentable. 29 For example, Einstein could not have patented the
formula E = me2, nor Pythagoras his theorem, nor Newton the laws of gravity.
21. "Compilation" is a term used by programmers to describe the process in which the high-
level source code is automatically transformed into low-level object code. The "compiler" that ac-
complishes this task is simply another program.
22. 35 U.S.C. § 101 (1982); see S. MANDELL, COMPUTERS, DATA PROCESSING, AND THE LAW
124-30 (1984).
23. See 35 U.S.C. § 154 (1982).
24. See 35 U.S.C. § 101 (1982).
25. See 35 U.S.C. §§ 102(a), (e) (1982).
26. See 35 U.S.C. § 103 (1982) ("A patent may not be obtained.., if the differences between
the subject matter ... and the prior art are such that the subject matter as a whole would have been
obvious at the time the invention was made to a person having ordinary skill in the art ... .
27. See 35 U.S.C. §§ 111, 112 (1982).
28. See H. HANNEMAN, THE PATENTABILITY OF COMPUTER SOFTWARE (1985); Comment,
The Protection of Property Rights in Computer Software, 14 AKRON L. REV. 85 (1980); Comment,
Intellectual Property Protection for Computer Programs: Are Patents Now Obtainable? 26 CATH.
U.L. REv. 835 (1977); Note, Patentability of Computer Programs, 56 DET. J. URB. L. 289 (1978);
Note, The Policy Implications of Granting Patent Protection to Computer Software: An Economic
Analysis, 37 VAND. L. REV. 147 (1984); Annotation, Patentability of Computer Programs, 6 A.L.R.
FED. 156 (1971).
In 1966 a Report by the President's Commission on the Patent System concluded that patent
laws are unsuitable for the protection of computer software. S. Doc. No. 5, 90th Cong., 1st Sess.,
12-13 (1966).
29. In O'Reilly v. Morse, 56 U.S. 62 (1853), the Court held that Samuel B. Morse could not
obtain exclusive rights for any device using electromagnetism to communicate over distances. To do
so, the Court reasoned, would grant an exclusive right to electromagnetism. See also Rubber-Tip
Pencil Co. v. Howard, 87 U.S. (20 Wall.) 498, 507 (1874) ("[a]n idea of itself is not patentable"); Le
Roy v. Tatham, 55 U.S. (14 How.) 156, 175 (1852) ("A principle, in the abstract, is a fundamental
truth; an original cause; a motive; these cannot be patented, as no one can claim in either of them an
exclusive right.").
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Because computer programs often utilize mathematical principles, past courts
have usually denied their patentability.30 However, in the 1981 case of Diamond
v. Diehr,31 the claimed invention involved a process for molding raw, uncured
synthetic rubber into cured precision products. The United States Supreme
Court concluded that a program may be included as part of an otherwise patent-
able machine or process: "[W]hen a claim containing a mathematical formula
implements or applies that formula in a structure or process which, when con-
sidered as a whole, is performing a function which the patent laws were designed
to protect,"'32 then the claim satisfies the requirements of patent law.
Diehr implicitly questions the applicability of patent protection per se for
computer software. One can infer from Diehr that computer programs by them-
selves are not patentable. However, more recently in Paine, Webber, Jackson &
Curtis v. Merrill Lynch, 33 the United States District Court for the District of
Delaware upheld the patentability of a sophisticated set of business-oriented
computer programs. Even if the decision in Paine, Webber stands and applica-
tion programs are patentable per se, using the patent laws as a means of protec-
tion for software may be impracticable: by the time a patent is issued the rapid
technological change in the industry would render many programs obsolete.
There never has been an obvious method of protecting computer software.
The legislative and judicial selection of copyright law as the solution indicates
only that this body of law seemed the most appropriate way to deal with the
problems of the time. Initial appropriateness, however, does not necessarily
mean that copyright law is the most effective way to deal with the problems
courts are addressing today.
30. See, eg., Parker v. Flook, 437 U.S. 584 (1978) (patent denied for mathematical method of
updating "alarm limits," the numbers which indicated safe temperature and pressure levels mea-
sured during catalytic conversion of hydrocarbons); Dann v. Johnston, 425 U.S. 219 (1976) (patent
denied for computer and computer program on ground of obviousness under § 103); Gottschalk v.
Benson, 409 U.S. 63 (1972) (patent denied for computerized process for converting binary-coded
decimal (BCD) numbers into ordinary decimal numbers, for a "mere idea" is an unpatentable
mental process).
Two cases, In re Freeman, 573 F.2d 1237 (CCPA 1978) and In re Walter, 618 F.2d 758 (CCPA
1980), limited the mathematical algorithm objection to patentability. One commentator explaining
the significance of these two decisions stated:
The Freeman-Walter test sets forth a two-step analysis for determining whether a
mathematical algorithm was statutory subject matter. First, the claim was analyzed to
determine whether a mathematical algorithm was directly or indirectly recited in the
claim. Second, if the mathematical algorithm was found, the claim as a whole was further
analyzed to determine whether the algorithm was applied in any manner to physical ele-
ments to process steps. If the algorithm applied to physical elements or the process steps,
then it passed muster under [35 U.S.C. § 101] and the overall invention was patentable.
R. RAYSMAN & P. BROWN, COMPUTER LAW: DRAFTING AND NEGOTIATING FORMS AND
AGREEMENTS § 5.07[3] (1987).
31. 450 U.S. 175 (1981).
32. Id. at 192.
33. 218 U.S.P.Q. 212 (D. Del. 1983) (upholding the validity of a patent for a "Securities Bro-
kerage-Cash Management System").
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A. The Legislative Initiative
Congress enacted the Copyright Act of 179031 to provide legal protection
for publishers and authors against unauthorized copying of printed material.
Congress had no way of predicting the evolution of nontraditional printed sub-
ject matter.35 In 1964 the Copyright Office reluctantly began accepting com-
puter programs for registration as books. 36 The 1976 Copyright Act (1976 Act),
effective January 1, 1978, 37 provided for copyright protection in "original works
of authorship fixed in any tangible medium of expression," including "literary
works."' 38 Although the 1976 Act did not expressly include computer software
as copyrightable subject matter, the legislative history and the definitions con-
tained within the Act clearly indicate that Congress intended the term "literary
works" to encompass computer programs. 39
However, section 102(b) of the 1976 Act precludes copyright protection for
"any idea, procedure, process, system, method of operation, concept, principle
or discovery, regardless of the form in which it is described, explained, illus-
trated or embodied in such work." 4° Section 102(b) is a codification 4 1 of the
unanimous Supreme Court decision in Baker v. Selden 4 2 where the Court found
that although the plaintiff owned a valid copyright in a book describing an ac-
counting system, which included blank forms consisting of ruled lines and head-
ings (based on the universally used T-accounts), the copyright did not preclude
others from using that accounting system.4 3 The Court was concerned that
copyright law not be used to monopolize ideas or utilitarian processes, but that it
34. Act of May 31, 1790, ch. 15, 1 Stat. 124.
35. The most notable development in American copyright law since 1790 has been its recurring
expansion. It now embraces "original works of authorship fixed in any tangible medium of expres-
sion... [including] literary works; musical works; dramatic works; pantomimes and choreographic
works; pictorial, graphic, and sculptural works; motion pictures and other audiovisual works; and
sound recordings." 17 U.S.C. § 102(a) (1982).
36. M. ScoTr, COMPUTER LAW § 3.4 (1987).
37. Pub. L. No. 94-553, 90 Stat. 2541 (1976) (codified at 17 U.S.C. §§ 101-810).
38. 17 U.S.C. § 102(a) (1982).
39. M. Scorr, supra note 36, § 3.5, at 3-9. Section 101 defines "literary works" as "works,
other than audiovisual works, expressed in words, numbers, or other verbal or numerical symbols or
indicia, regardless of the nature of the material objects, such as books, periodicals, manuscripts,
phonorecords, film, tapes, disks, or cards, in which they are embodied." 17 U.S.C. § 101 (1982)
(emphasis added). The legislative history of § 101 reveals that "literary works . . . include...
computer programs to the extent that they incorporate authorship in the programmer's expression of
original ideas, as distinguished from the ideas themselves." H.R. REP. No. 1476, 94th Cong., 2d
Sess. at 54, reprinted in 1976 U.S. CODE CONG. & ADMIN. NEws 5659, 5667.
40. 17 U.S.C. § 102(b) (1982).
41. See H.R. REP. No. 1476, 94th Cong., 2d Sess., reprinted in 1976 U.S. CODE CONG. &
ADMIN. NEWS 5659, 5670 (Section 102(b) is intended to "restate... that the basic dichotomy
between expression and idea remains unchanged.").
42. 101 U.S. 99 (1879).
43. Professor Nimmer observed:
The doctrine of Baker v. Selden rests upon the premise that the copyright laws may not be
used to obtain a monopoly on a system or method for performing commercial or scientific
functions.... From this acceptable premise, the courts have reasoned that if the only
manner of performing the system or method is by copying a written expression, then the
copyright liability must be denied for such writing when used to perform such system or
method, else the system or method itself will be monopolized.
1 M. NIMMER, NIMMER ON CopYRIGHT § 2.18(C) (1978).
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only be used to protect the expression of the idea or process.44
In 1974 Congress created the National Commission on New Technological
Uses of Copyrighted Works (CONTU) 45 to evaluate the problems associated
with protecting proprietary rights in software and to make specific recommenda-
tions for legislation that would adequately protect the interests of software de-
velopers.46 After three years of data collection, hearings, analysis and
deliberation, the majority of CONTU recommended that the 1976 Copyright
Act "be amended to make it explicit that computer programs, to the extent that
they embody an author's original creation, are proper subject matter of copy-
right."47 Based on the recommendations of CONTU, Congress responded in the
1980 Computer Software Copyright Acta8 by adding a provision defining com-
puter programs and by replacing the old section 117 with a new section 117,
authorizing the owner of a copy of a computer program to make essential adap-
tations for use with the computer or for archival purposes. 49
The CONTU Report remains significant because it represents the only leg-
islative history reflecting the meaning and scope of the revisions enacted by Con-
gress. Moreover, several court decisions applying copyright law to computer
programs have looked to the Report for guidance when rendering their
decisions.50
44. Baker, 101 U.S. at 103-04; see also Mazer v. Stein, 347 U.S. 201, 217 (1954) ("Unlike a
patent, a copyright gives no exclusive right to the art disclosed; protection is given only to the
expression of the idea-not the idea itself.") (citation omitted).
45. NATIONAL COMM'N ON NEW TECHNOLOGICAL USES OF COPYRIGHTED WORKS, FINAL
REPORT 9 (1978) [hereinafter CONTU REPORT].
46. See eg., 120 CONG. REC. 41415 (1974) (the evaluation by CONTU "is inherently valuable
in our forthcoming review of the copyright laws. With the advent of computer technology, recall
electronics, data storage and the like, it is impossible for our courts to handle cases of copyright
infringement under the [former copyright] law.") (statement by Rep. Danielson).
47. CONTU REPORT, supra note 45, at 2. Commissioner Hersey dissented from this recom-
mendation, arguing that "[tihe Act of 1976 should be amended to make it explicit that copyright
protection does not extend to a computer program in the form in which it is capable of being used to
control computer operations." Id. at 2. Hersey based his dissent on the belief that "[w]orks of
authorship have always been intended to be circulated to human beings and to be used by them-to
be read, heard, seen, for either pleasurable or practical ends. Computer programs, in their mature
phase, are addressed to machines." Id. at 70.
48. 17 U.S.C. § 101 (1982) ("[A] computer program is a set of statements or instructions to be
used directly or indirectly in a computer in order to bring about a certain result.").
49. Section 117 currently provides in part:
It is not an infringement for the owner of a copy of a computer program to make or
authorize the making of another copy or adaptation of that program provided:
(1) that such new copy or adaptation is created as an essential step in the utilization
of the computer program in conjunction with a machine and that it is used in no other
manner, or
(2) that such new copy or adaptation is for archival purposes only and that all archi-
val copies are destroyed in the event that continued possession of the computer program
should cease to be rightful.
17 U.S.C. § 117 (1982).
50. See, eg., Apple Computer, Inc. v. Formula Int'l, Inc., 725 F.2d 521 (9th Cir. 1984) (making
reference to CONTU REPORT as authority for its decision); Apple Computer, Inc. v. Franklin Com-
puter Corp., 714 F.2d 1240, 1251 (3d Cir. 1983) (relied on CONTU REPORT), cert. dismissed, 464
U.S. 1033 (1984). "Although the Congressional action in 1980 does not appear to be supported by a
legislative history, it is fair to conclude, since Congress adopted its recommendations without altera-
tion, that the CONTU Report reflects the Congressional intent." Midway Mfg. Co. v. Strohon, 564
F. Supp. 741, 750 n.6 (N.D. Ill. 1983).
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B. The Judicial Attempt at Applying Copyright Law
Armed with a congressional mandate, the courts were ready to resolve
software misappropriation disputes. Courts, however, were faced with the di-
lemma of applying traditional copyright principles to a nontraditional copyright
subject matter. First, under traditional principles the protected literary expres-
sion was meant to communicate with humans. The programmer's literary ex-
pression, in contrast, is intended in its mature state to communicate with a
machine.51 Second, a computer program, unlike traditional forms of subject
matter, is a utilitarian work rather than an artistic or fictional one in that it
causes a computer to perform various tasks.5 2 Third, the judiciary system as a
whole lacks the highly intricate understanding of computer functioning and thus
is not equipped to differentiate one programmer's expression from another coded
expression, thereby frustrating application of the "substantial similarity" test.53
51. As observed by one commentator:
The extension of copyright protection to computer software requires the courts to
apply copyright principles to a type of literary work which is different in certain ways from
any other protected by the copyright laws. The most fundamental of these differences is
that computer programs lack the communicative function of traditional literary works.
Gesmer, Developments in the Law of Computer Software Copyright Infringement, 26 JURIMETRICS J.
224, 225 (Spring 1986). Another commentator stated that "[niew tests and modified legal principles
will have to be developed to deal with computers-a form of'literary machines.'" Davis, Computer
Software-The Final Frontier Clones, Compatibility and Copyright, COMPUTER LAW., June 1985,
at 1, 3.
52. The functional component of a work does not receive protection under the copyright laws.
See, eg., Esquire, Inc. v. Ringer, 591 F.2d 796 (1978) (denying validity of copyright for overall
shape of outdoor lighting fixture because granting protection for mere utilitarian articles would lead
to widespread protection for industrial designs). The definition of "pictorial, graphic, and sculptural
works" in section 101 of the Copyright Act includes "works of artistic craftsmanship insofar as their
form but not their mechanical or utilitarian aspects." 17 U.S.C. § 101 (1982).
Often it is difficult, if not impossible, to distinguish between a work's artistic expression and its
functional component. In Apple Computer, Inc. v. Franklin Computer Corp., 714 F.2d 1240 (3d
Cir. 1983), cert. dismissed, 464 U.S. 1033 (1984), Franklin argued that Apple's operating system (a
collection of systems software programs that allows the computer to perform programming tasks,
execute programs, and direct input and output tasks) was a purely "utilitarian work" which could
not be copyrighted and that Apple was seeking to block the use of the art embodied in its operating
systems. Id. at 1251. The court rejected Franklin's argument because nothing in the copyright
statute supports the argument that an intention to use a copyrightable article in industry invalidates
its registration, so long as it contains copyrightable expression. Id. at 1251-52.
53. Because direct evidence of copying is rarely available, copying may be established by proof
of "access" and "substantial similarity." See Midway Mfg. Co. v. Strohon, 564 F. Supp. 741 (N.D.
I11. 1983) (applying "substantial similarity" test). The leading case in this area is Arstein v. Porter,
154 F.2d 464 (2d Cir. 1946), cert denied, 330 U.S. 851 (1947), in which the court established a two-
step test for determining substantial similarity. The two-step test requires the application of (I) an
"extrinsic" test directed at determining whether there exists a substantial similarity in the underlying
ideas; and (2) an "intrinsic" test to determine whether there is substantial similarity in the expression
of the underlying idea. See Sid & Marty Krofft Television Prods., Inc. v. McDonald's Corp., 562
F.2d 1157, 1164 (9th Cir. 1977). Traditionally, expert testimony is admissible to prove similarity
under the extrinsic test, but the intrinsic test is administered only by the "ordinary lay observer." Id.
This caused obvious difficulties when an ordinary lay observer was asked to compare the similarity
of two computer programs. To alleviate this problem, the courts generally have abandoned the
bifurcated test of substantial similarity in computer copyright disputes in favor of an integrated
substantial similarity test in which both lay and expert testimony is admissible. See Whelan Assocs.
v. Jaslow Dental Laboratories, 797 F.2d 1222, 1233 (3d Cir. 1986) ("[We believe that the ordinary
observer test is not useful and is potentially misleading when the subjects of the copyright are partic-
ularly complex, such as computer programs."), cert. denied, 107 S. Ct. 887 (1987); E.F. Johnson Co.
v. Uniden Corp. of Am., 623 F. Supp. 1485, 1492 (D. Minn. 1985) (substantial similarity test un-
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Despite these obstacles, the courts solidified the applicability of copyright
law to computer software in several first generation cases. Although Congress
had helped define the term "computer programs," courts were left with the task
of determining whether the definition extended to programs written in object
code, whether operating system programs were to be protected,54 and whether
tangible mediums of expression included programs embedded in silicon chips,
such as ROMs,s s PROMs,56 and EPROMs.5 7 Although one pre-1980 amend-
ment court opinion stated that a ROM silicon chip containing a computer pro-
gram was not a copy of the program subject to copyright protection,58 since the
landmark case of Apple Computer, Inc. v. Franklin Computer Corp.59 the over-
whelming majority of courts have found that copyright protection extends to all
computer programs, whether in object or source code, or whether stored on any
fixed media, tape, disk, ROM chips, or any other such device.60
Although courts had to overcome some fundamental difficulties with this
nontraditional and complex subject matter, the old copyright concepts adapted
well because these first generation cases involved extensive and verbatim copying
of the plaintiff's underlying code. These cases could easily be equated to a clas-
sic hypothetical case in which an infringer duplicated an entire book, made rela-
tively few, if any, changes, and then sold the book as her own.
workable in computer cases); Midway Mfg. Co. v. Strohon, 564 F. Supp. at 752-53 (relied entirely on
expert testimony to find substantial similarity).
One recommendation is that courts shift the emphasis from the "substantial similarity" test and
focus on the defendant's conduct and on the advantage the defendant gained from the infringement.
Conley & Bryan, A Unifying Theory for the Litigation of Computer Software Copyright Cases, 63
N.C.L. REV. 563 (1985); see also Note, Copyright Infringement of Computer Programs: A Modiflca-
tion of the Substantial Similarity Test, 68 MINN. L. REv. 1264, 1285-88 (1984) (substantial similarity
test has little value when applied to computer programs); Note, Copyright Infringement Actions: The
Proper Role for Audience Reactions in Determining Substantial Similarity, 54 S. CAL. L. Rnv. 385,
399-404 (1981) (criticizing lay observer standard in certain instances).
54. See supra note 52.
55. Read Only Memory.
56. Programmable Read Only Memory.
57. Erasable Programmable Read Only Memory.
58. See Data Cash Sys. v. JS&A Group, Inc., 480 F. Supp. 1063, 1066-69 (N.D. I1. 1979),
aff'd, 628 F.2d 1038 (7th Cir. 1980).
59. 714 F.2d 1240 (3d Cir. 1983), cert dismissed, 464 U.S. 1033 (1984).
60. See Apple Computer, Inc. v. Formula Int'l, Inc., 725 F.2d 521 (9th Cir. 1984) (all computer
programs as embodied in ROMs and diskettes are copyrightable subject matter); Franklin, 714 F.2d
1240 (source and object code copyrightable, notwithstanding ROM embedded on silicon chip); Wil-
liams Electronics, Inc. v. Artic Int'l, Inc., 685 F.2d 870 (3d Cir. 1982) (statutory requirement of
"fixation" satisfied through embodiment of expression in ROM); E.F. Johnson Co. v. Uniden Corp.
of Am., 623 F. Supp. 1485 (D. Minn. 1985) (object program stored in EPROM protected by copy-
right); Midway Mfg. Co. v. Strohon, 564 F. Supp. 741 (N.D. 111. 1983) ("instruction ROMs" copy-
rightable subject matter); GCA Corp. v. Chance, 217 U.S.P.Q. 718 (N.D. Cal. 1982) (object code
part of operating system loaded onto EPROM copyrightable subject matter); Tandy Corp. v. Per-
sonal Micro Computers, Inc., 524 F. Supp. 171 (N.D. Cal. 1981) (object code part of an operating
system on a ROM was copyrightable subject matter); see also Homing, Copyright Protection of Com-
puter Software, in COMPUTER LITIGATION 1985 TRIAL TACTICS AND TECHNIQUES 115, 123-24
(Practicing Law Inst. ed. 1985) (listing computer-related cases construing "copyrightable subject
matter").
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1. The Merger of Idea and Expression
The current focus has shifted from issues regarding the copyrightability of
certain forms of programs and various acceptable mediums of expression to
questions about the degree of similarity required before a second work consti-
tutes an infringing copy. 61 In general these cases do not involve the line by line,
verbatim duplication encountered in earlier cases, but the copying of a pro-
gram's overall structure, sequence, organization, and even its manner of
operation.
In one of the most important and controversial computer copyright cases to
date, Whelan Associates, Inc. v. Jaslow Dental Laboratories, Inc.,62 the United
States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit ruled that "copyright protection of
computer programs may extend beyond the program's literal code to their struc-
ture, sequence, and organization. '63 Plaintiff did not allege, nor did the court
find, any copying of the literal elements of a program-the source or object
codes. Rather, the court found that the overall structure of defendant's program
was substantially similar to the overall structure of plaintiff's program. An
overview of the facts in this case is essential to an understanding of the court's
conclusion.
Defendant-appellant Jaslow Dental Laboratory and plaintiff Whelan Asso-
ciates, a custom-software developer, entered into a contractual arrangement
whereby plaintiff agreed to design and code a computer program that would
automate the business functions of defendant's dental laboratory.64 The pro-
gram, "Dentalab", was written for an IBM Series One machine in a computer
language known as EDL.65 The contract stipulated that the program would
remain the property of plaintiff and that defendant would receive a ten percent
royalty for every other copy sold.
While this business relationship continued, defendant Rand Jaslow, realiz-
ing the economic potential of a comparable program that would run on an IBM
PC or compatible, began to develop such a program written in the BASIC pro-
gramming language. Because Rand did not possess the computer expertise to
properly finish this project, he employed a professional computer programmer to
complete the program. Rand then terminated the existing contract with Whelan
and began marketing his "Dentcom" program, which he advertised as "a new
version of the Dentlab [sic] computer system."'6 6 Rand also sent a letter to Whe-
lan Associates warning them against the further marketing of the Dentalab pro-
gram, which Rand maintained contained valuable trade secrets of Jaslow Dental
61. See Radcliffe, Recent Developments in Copyright Law Related to Computer Software, 4
COMPUTER L. REP. 189 (1985); Note, Defining the Scope of Copyright Protection for Computer
Software, 38 STAN. L. REv. 497 (1986).
62. 797 F.2d 1222 (3d Cir. 1986), cert. denied, 107 S. Ct. 877 (1987).
63. Id. at 1248.
64. Id. at 1225. The "business functions" included registering and processing inventory, updat-
ing customer lists, invoicing, billing, and other general accounting tasks.
65. Event Driven Language.
66. Whelan, 797 F.2d at 1227.
1988]
NORTH CAROLINA LAW REVIEW
Laboratory. 67
Because the programs were written in two different languages, the code
could not be an exact duplication. Moreover, plaintiff did not allege that defend-
ant's Dentcom program was a "translation" of plaintiff's Dentalab program
(Le., the logical equivalent of a translation from English to French).68 Rather,
plaintiff argued that its copyright had been infringed because defendant's pro-
gram was substantially similar in three respects: the file structures, the screen
outputs, and five subroutines. 69 Rand Jaslow also admitted to having access to
the Dentalab source code.
After discounting the need for the traditional ordinary observer test when
applied to complex computer software cases, 70 the court focused its attention on
the scope of computer software protection. The court resolved that because
copyrights of other literary works can be infringed even absent substantial simi-
larity between the works' literal elements, there is no reason to establish a rule
denying structural protection when applied to software. 7 1 Defendants con-
tended that the nonliteral components of a program necessarily entailed the pro-
gram's idea and thus could not receive protection. 72 Recognizing that copyright
law only protects the expression of an idea, the court agreed with the district
court's all-encompassing view that the expression in a software program is "the
manner in which the program operates, controls and regulates the computer in
receiving, assembling, calculating, retaining, correlating, and producing useful
information either on a screen, printout or by audio communication." 73
The language of the court seems to expressly ignore the "procedures,"
"processes," and "methods of operation" excluded from copyright by section
102(b), 74 thereby crossing the threshold from the protection of expression into
the protection of the underlying idea.75 Yet, instead of quibbling with the
67. Id. at 1226.
68. As one court observed:
[I]t is as clear an infringement to translate a computer program from, for example, FOR-
TRAN to ALGOL, as it is to translate a novel or play from English to French. In each
case the substance of the expression ... is the same between original and copy, with only
the external manifestation of the expression changing.
Synercom Technology, Inc. v. University Computing Co., 462 F. Supp. 1003, 1013 n.5 (N.D. Tex.
1978).
69. Whelan, 797 F.2d at 1228. A "subroutine" is a group of programming statements that are
logically grouped together to perform a specific task.
70. See supra note 53.
71. Whelan, 797 F.2d at 1234. The Whelan court relied on cases that prohibited copying of
plots or plot devices in plays or books. See Twentieth Century-Fox Film Corp. v. MCA, Inc., 715
F.2d 1327, 1329 (9th Cir. 1983) (plot similarities between "Battlestar Galactica" and "Star Wars"
may be basis for infringement); Sid & Marty Krofft Television Prods., Inc. v. McDonald's Corp., 562
F.2d 1157, 1167 (9th Cir. 1977) (similarities between McDonaldland characters and H.R. Pufnstuf
characters can be established by showing the similarity in the "total concept and feel" of the two);
Nichols v. Universal Pictures Corp., 45 F.2d 119, 121 (2d Cir. 1930) (copyright "cannot be limited
literally to the text, else a plagiarist would escape by immaterial variations").
72. Whelan, 797 F.2d at 1235.
73. Id. at 1239 (emphasis added). The Whelan court was encouraged by the holding in SAS
Inst., Inc. v. S & H Computer Sys., 605 F. Supp. 816 (M.D. Tenn. 1985), despite the SAS court's
finding evidence of similarity in both literal and organizational aspects. Whelan, 797 F.2d at 1239.
74. See supra text accompanying note 40.
75. This holding is in direct opposition to the position taken by the Copyright Office, which is
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court's misuse of statutory language or engaging in a semantic debate, it may be
more prudent to examine the inherent practical problems that surface when pro-
tection is extended to the organization and structure of computer software.
The court's formulation of protected expression represents a broad view of
the idea of the program. The court stated that the idea in this program was the
"efficient organization of a dental laboratory."' 76 The court formulated a line
between the idea and expression by making reference to the end sought to be
achieved: "In other words, the purpose or function of a utilitarian work would
be the work's idea, and everything that is not necessary to that purpose or func-
tion would be part of the expression of the idea." 77 Thus, the court reasoned,
"[w]here there are various means of achieving the desired purpose, then the par-
ticular means chosen is not necessary to the purpose; hence, there is expression,
not idea."17 8
This "means-end" analysis is dangerous in the context of computer pro-
gramming. Various "means" chosen by programmers are often dictated by rea-
sons of efficiency, including programmer's time, speed of computer execution,
and size of compiled code.79 These efficient means and methods of programming
are taught to computer science students in school and business. *For purposes of
illustration in a nonprogramming context, students are taught to learn multipli-
cation tables (5 X 4 = 20) so that they refrain from multiple addition (5 + 5 +
5 + 5 = 20). Students of computer programming are taught to choose certain
statements over others for the same efficiency reasons. For example, a program-
mer writing in Pascal could achieve the same desired purpose of printing the
word "dangerous" on the screen ten times in various ways, one of which is as
follows:
Writeln ("dangerous");
Writeln ("dangerous");
Writeln ("dangerous");
Writeln ("dangerous");
the agency responsible for administration of the Copyright Act. The Copyright Office publishes
"circulars" that explain copyright law to lay persons. The Copyright Office's Circular R61 (May
1983) supports a more narrow scope of copyright protection:
EXTENT OF COPYRIGHT PROTECTION
Copyright protection extends to the literary or textual expression contained in the
computer program. Copyright protection is not available for ideas, program logic, algo-
rithms, systems, methods, concepts, or layouts.
Circular R61 (May 1983) (emphasis added). The Whelan court stated that the circular should be
given marginal weight and that "to the extent that the Copyright Office's circular differs, it should
not be followed." Whelan, 797 F.2d at 1242 n.38.
76. Id. at 1240.
77. Id. at 1236.
78. Id. The court further stated: "This test is necessarily difficult to state, and it may be diffi-
cult to understand in the abstract." Id. at 1236 n.28.
79. See Petition For A Writ of Certiorari To The United States Court Of Appeals For The
Third Circuit at 16, Whelan Assocs., Inc. v. Jaslow Dental Laboratories, Inc., 797 F.2d 1222 (3d
Cir. 1986), cert denied, 107 S. Ct. 877 (1987) [hereinafter Petition For Certiorari]. Moreover, this
test may be problematic in the realm of microprocessors, in which the sequence and ordering of the
microinstructions are often dictated by the microprocessor hardware. See Steinberg, NEC v. Intel:
The Battle Over Copyright Protection For Microcode, 27 JURIMETRICS J. 173 (1987).
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Writeln ("dangerous");
Writeln ("dangerous");
Writeln ("dangerous");
Writeln ("dangerous");
Writeln ("dangerous");
Writeln ("dangerous");
Or, the programmer could implement the following statements:
For I := 1 to 10 do begin
Writein ("dangerous");
end;
Obviously, the latter method would be the more desirable coding technique.
With a computer program there are often optimal methods of programming and
various programming techniques that are dictated by reasons of efficiency. This
is not true with traditional literary works. There is no most efficient way to
write poetic lines, musical notes, or romantic novels.80 Yet efficient "structures"
and "organization" are commonplace in the programming arena. In fact, most
sophisticated programming students are required to take courses in "data struc-
tures" and "computer organization." 8 1 Judicial protection of a program's struc-
ture, sequence, organization, and methods of operation may, in certain
instances, be analogized to protection of multiplication tables, an event that
would be precluded even by patent law.8 2
As this example illustrates, application of traditional copyright analysis to
computer programs fails because software is not a traditional form of literary
work.83 Granted, several efficient ways exist to produce a given result in a com-
puter program, but courts are not equipped to determine the extent to which a
program's structure has been copied. 84 The holding may ultimately depend on
which party's expert is the most persuasive and which expert the court deems
80. Petition For Certiorari, supra note 79, at 16.
81. See, eg., R. KRUSE, DATA STRUCTURES & PROGRAM DESIGN (1984); A. TANENBAUM,
STRUCTURED COMPUTER ORGANIZATION (1984).
82. The court attempted to rid itself of this inconsistency by stating in a footnote: "Of course
structural similarities between two programs can also arise in completely legitimate ways--e.g.,
where the authors of the two programs have included subroutines from common, unprotected sub-
routine libraries, or where the authors of both programs have consulted common, public domain,
reference books." Whelan, 797 F.2d at 1248 n.47. But then even the court recognized the difficulty:
"There can be no bright line rules as to when similarities are evidence of infringement and when they
are legitimate." Id.
The United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit recently "decline[d] to embrace" the
Whelan Court's strict holding that the mere showing of substantial similarity of organization and
structure together with access is sufficient to establish copyright infringement. Plains Cotton Coop.
Ass'n v. Goodpasture Computer Serv., 807 F.2d 1256, 1262 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 108 S. Ct. 80
(1987). The court recognized that similarity in organization and structure do not necessarily denote
a copyright infringement. In Plains the court affirmed the lower court's refusal to grant a prelimi-
nary injunction because plaintiff failed to show substantial likelihood of success on its copyright
claim. The court reasoned that the similarities between the two programs in this case were dictated
by the externalities of the cotton market, for "market factors play a significant role in determining
the sequence and organization of cotton marketing software, and we decline to hold that those pat-
terns cannot constitute 'ideas' in a computer context." Id.
83. Davis, Computer Software-The Final Frontier: Clones, Compatibility And Copyright,
COMPUTER LAw., June 1985, at 1, 3.
84. See, eg., SAS Inst., Inc. v. S & H Computer Sys., 605 F. Supp. 816, 832 (M.D. Tenn. 1985)
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most credible.85 Moreover, a good programmer can take source code and rear-
range subroutines, change variable names, and disguise copying in ways that
make tenuous any determination of structural similarity, even by another pro-
gramming expert.
The cases that expanded the traditional copyright protection from the copy-
ing of the literal elements of a program's code to the copying of its overall struc-
ture and organization are tainted with facts in which the losing party was guilty
of egregious conduct. Faced with the choice of denying equitable relief or dis-
torting the copyright law by crossing the idea-expression barrier, courts chose
the latter.
The proposition that the overall structure and organization of a computer
program is an important consideration in a software copyright infringement suit
was first stated by a court in SAS Institute, Inc. v. S & H Computer Systems.8 6
The case involved the alleged copying of plaintiff's "SAS" statistical analysis
program. The court took note of at least 44 instances of defendant's direct copy-
ing from plaintiff's source code and could have rested its opinion on literal, line-
by-line copyright infringement without looking to the elements of organization
and structure. However, the determination that defendant's conduct was espe-
cially egregious seemed to be integral to the court's conclusions.8 7 The court
noted that defendant made obvious attempts to disguise evidence of copying,
made no preliminary design plans for its DEC version of SAS, and that it en-
tered into a licensing arrangement with the SAS Institute to obtain the pro-
gram's source code knowing from the outset that it would breach the express
terms of the contract. The court concluded that defendant's conduct relative to
the licensing agreement "cannot be said to comply with its legal duty of good
faith and fair dealing."8 8
Most courts evaluating a copyright infringement claim have looked only to
two classic elements: 1) proof that the injured party owned the copyrighted
material; and 2) the existence of copying usually established by the determina-
tion that the two competing works are substantially similar and that the alleged
infringer had access to the copyrighted material.8 9 However, use of copyright
("This Court is not a computer programmer, and is simply not able to determine, out of 186,000
lines of integrated product code, which of them reflect misappropriation.").
85. The trial court in Whelan gave great weight to plaintiff's more credible expert: "I conclude
... that Dr. Moore, plaintiff's expert had greater knowledge as to the particular programs at issue
.... To the extent that Dr. Moore's testimony supports plaintiff's contentions of copying, I find his
testimony more credible and helpful . Whelan, 609 F. Supp. at 1321-22.
86. 605 F. Supp. 816, 830 (M.D. Tenn. 1985) ("the copying proven at trial does not affect only
the specific lines of code cited by [plaintiff's expert] .... Rather, to the extent that it represents
copying of the organization and structural details of SAS, such copying pervades the entire S & H
product.") (relying on the reasoning of Meredith Corp. v. Harper & Row Publishers, Inc., 378 F.
Supp. 686 (S.D.N.Y), aff'd, 500 F.2d 1221 (2d Cir. 1974), opinion after trial, 413 F. Supp. 385
(S.D.N.Y 1975)).
87. The court concluded that the SAS source code was "extensively and systematically used by
S & H in the preparation of S & H's product." SAS, 605 F. Supp. at 822.
88. Id. at 828. The court also found instances of "slavish copying." Id. at 826.
89. See Plains Cotton Coop. Ass'n v. Goodpasture Computer Serv., 807 F.2d 1256, 1260 (5th
Cir.), cert. denied, 108 S. Ct. 80 (1987); Miller v. Universal City Studios, 650 F.2d 1365, 1375 (5th
Cir. 1981); 3 M. NIMMER, supra note 43, § 12.11[D].
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law to provide equitable relief has led at least one commentator to suggest that
courts should explicitly recognize that conduct of a party is a legitimate element
to be considered in a software copyright dispute: "It often will be inappropriate
in software cases simply to compare the competing works to determine whether
they are substantially similar. Rather, the technology dictates a focus on the
defendant's conduct and any advantage he has gained from it."90
In 1986 a Congressional report examined the impact recent and anticipated
advances in technology will have on the intellectual property system and partic-
ularly copyright law.9 1 Congress's Office of Technology Assessment ("OTA")
report concluded that an inherent incompatibility exists between computer
software protection and copyright law:
Regardless of how legal scholars resolve the issue of idea and ex-
pression, the Federal courts, in interpreting copyright law, will eventu-
ally face a dilemma; either: 1) the copyrightable expression in a
computer program will be limited to the strict line-by-line program
code, in which case the unscrupulous might easily escape liability for
infringement by simply varying the code in a trivial way, or 2) the
copyrightable expression will be extended to the logic, design, struc-
ture, performance or even the output of the program, in which case
one has copyrighted a "procedure, process, system, or method of oper-
ation." The cases that have been decided thus far indicate that the
courts are adopting the latter alternative, and have extended the mean-
ing of expression in computer programs to include the processes that
the programs implement....
In theory, none of these rulings is permitted under traditional
copyright principles. This is not because the courts have misinter-
preted copyright law, but because copyright law cannot be successfully
applied to computer programs. 92
-2. The "Look and Feel" Cases
The previously discussed cases involved the scope of protection extended to
90. Conley & Bryan, supra note 53, at 612.
91. U.S. CONGRESS, OFFICE OF TECHNOLOGY ASSESSMENT, INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY
RIGHTS IN AN AGE OF ELECTRONICS AND INFORMATION, OTA-CIT-302 (Washington, DC: U.S.
Government Printing Office, April 1986) [hereinafter OTA REPORT]. This report was requested by
Senator Charles Mathias, Jr., Chairman of the Senate Judiciary Committee, Subcommittee on Pat-
ents, Copyrights and Trademarks; and by Congressman Peter W. Rodino, Jr., Chairman of the
House Judiciary Committee, Congressman Robert W. Kastenmeier, Chairman of the Subcommittee
on Courts, Civil Liberties, and the Administration of Justice, Congressman Hamilton Fish, and
Congressman Carlos Moorhead. Id. at iii.
The OTA's conclusion that copyright law is fundamentally incompatible with software technol-
ogy protection has already been sharply criticized for reflecting a "conceit that permeates human
history: the belief that the present is so special-so utterly distinct from the past-that solutions
found by previous generations for their problems offer little if any guidance today." Baumgarten &
Meyer, supra note 4, at 10. These commentators, however, wholeheartedly applaud how well tradi-
tional copyright law concepts have adapted to recent cases without examining the effect such appli-
cation has on the competitive process. Such an evaluation is analogous to concluding that a
chocolate cake has an exquisite flavor because all the right ingredients were used, without ever tast-
ing it.
92. OTA REPORT, supra note 91, at 81.
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the underlying code of computer software-the source and object code. The
most recent controversy in the computer law arena involves the scope of protec-
tion copyright affords to the visual output of computer software. The visual
output of software is analogous to a clock face and the object code is like the
clockworks. It appears from the current judicial trend that a second program-
mer will be precluded from independently developing software that emulates the
functions and operations of an already existing program.
Technological growth has always depended on innovators improving and
building on the work of their predecessors. 93 This is often described as a desire
not to force inventors to re-invent the wheel. Similarly, the competitive process
can thrive only when producers may freely enter markets and compete with
similar products.
Suppose, for example, that A was the sole producer of Calvin Keen jeans in
the town of Brookeville. A great demand for these jeans arose among teenagers
because of the stylish, slender fit and the designer look. Producer A had a lim-
ited supply of these jeans and was able to sell them at double the cost of produc-
tion. Competitor B, in a neighboring town, wanted to take advantage of these
tremendous profits so she designed a similar jean, entered A's market, and sold
her jean at two-thirds the price of Producer A's jeans. All the teenagers in
Brookeville began buying this less-expensive jean because it looked just as good
and the lower price made their parents much happier. Once Producer A recog-
nized that he was losing business to Competitor B, he quickly lowered his prices
below that of B's jeans. Soon this competitive struggle between Producer A and
Competitor B drove the price of the jeans down to their cost of production.
Meanwhile, instead of becoming fat and lazy and resting on the success of his
Calvin Keen jean, Producer A realized that the competitive market would not
allow him to reap profits forever. Accordingly, Producer A was ready to market
his sleek new designer shirt that would bear the well-known and cherished Cal-
vin Keen label... and the process continues.
In much the same way, it is important that software competitors be allowed
to produce similar, yet non-copied programs to compete with those programs
that are already reaping profits. Copyright protection was not originally in-
tended to prevent competitors from offering similar products. The United States
District Court for The Middle District of Tennessee in SAS Institute, Inc. v. S &
H Computer Systems 94 recognized the importance of allowing programmers to
write independent, yet similar code, "'one is always free to make the machine
do the same thing as it would if it had the copyrighted work placed in it, but
only by one's own creative effort rather than by piracy.' "95
In practice this statement is no longer accurate. The protection now pro-
93. The court in Whelan Assocs. v. Jaslow Dental Laboratories, 797 F.2d 1222 (3d Cir. 1986),
cert. denied, 107 S. Ct. 877 (1987), acknowledged that "copyright law has always recognized and
tried to accommodate the fact that all intellectual pioneers build on the work of their predecessors."
Id. at 1238.
94. 605 F. Supp. 816 (M.D. Tenn. 1985).
95. Id. at 829 (quoting National Commission on New Technological Uses of Copyrighted
Works, Final Report, 21 (1978)).
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vided by copyright law for software's audiovisual display, derivative works, and
compilations creates an insurmountable barrier to competitor entry in the
software market.
a. Audiovisual and Derivative Works
The subject matter of a valid copyright may contain an original work of
authorship in literary works, motion pictures, or other audiovisual works.9 6 Au-
diovisual works are defined as any work consisting of "a series of related images
which are intrinsically intended to be shown by the use of machines... together
with [any] accompanying sounds."' 97 The audiovisual copyright can be in-
fringed without infringing the literary copyright in the computer program's ob-
ject and source codes. 98
The test for the copyrightability of an audiovisual display is the same as
that for a literary work: whether the work conveys expression that is distin-
guishable from the underlying idea.99 The early software cases that relied on
audiovisual copyright were the long line of entertainment-oriented videogame
cases. 10 Each case involved computer programs that generated artistic and fan-
ciful audiovisual displays. Atari, Inc. v. North American Philips Consumer Elec-
tronics Corp. 101 involved the alleged infringement of the popular Pac-Man game,
which displays a "gobbler" being guided through a maze appearing to gobble up
dots in its path while being chased through the maze by several "ghost mon-
sters." The United States Court of Appeals for The Seventh Circuit held that
the play of the game, strategy, and the underlying maze-chase concept was not
protected, but that the expression, as articulated in the "gobbler" and "ghost
monsters" was protected in that these characters were "wholly fanciful cre-
ations, without reference to the real world."10 2
At some point, however, the screen display becomes too plain and ordinary
to be distinguishable from the idea. The United States Court of Appeals for The
Second Circuit in Stern Electronics v. Kaufman 10 3 realized the limitation of the
audiovisual copyright protection:
We need not decide at what point the repeating sequence of images
would form too insubstantial a portion of an entire display to warrant
a copyright, nor the somewhat related issue of whether a sequence of
images (e.g., a spaceship shooting down an attacking plane) might con-
96. 17 U.S.C. § 102(a) (1982).
97. 17 U.S.C. § 101 (1982).
98. See Atari, Inc. v. North American Philips Consumer Electronics Corp., 672 F.2d 607 (7th
Cir.), cert. denied, 459 U.S. 880 (1982).
99. 17 U.S.C. § 102(b) (1982); see Russo and Derwin, Copyright in the "Look and Feel" of
Computer Software, COMPUTER LAW., Feb. 1985, at 5.
100. See Williams Electronics, Inc. v. Artic Int'l, Inc., 685 F.2d 870 (3d Cir. 1982); Midway
Mfg. Co. v. Strohon, 564 F. Supp. 741 (N.D. Ill. 1983); see also Stem Electronics, Inc. v. Kaufman,
523 F. Supp. 635 (E.D.N.Y. 1981), aff'd, 669 F.2d 852 (2d Cir. 1982) (establishing the basic validity
of audiovisual copyright for videogame displays).
101. 672 F.2d 607 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 459 U.S. 880 (1982).
102. Id. at 618.
103. 669 F.2d 852 (2d Cir. 1982).
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tain so little in the way of particularized form of expression as to be
only an abstract idea portrayed in a non-copyrightable form.'1 4
The current judicial trend has shifted from allowing software manufacturers to
use the audiovisual copyright to protect entertainment software involving fanci-
ful creatures and characters to allowing this protection to extend to the user
interface of productivity or commercial software containing little or no artistic
or creative originality.
Audiovisual copyright may now protect the appearances, executable
images, and input formats produced by the software on the monitor screens and
the sequence of keystrokes used to manipulate information or desired functions
by the user. This interaction between a user and a software program is often
referred to as the "user interface" of a program. Some commentators equate the
protection of a program's user interface with the protection of a program's "look
and feel."' 10 5
Consider a hypothetical word processor. When a user wants to print a doc-
ument, he might achieve this desired function by pressing the escape key and
then selecting the appropriate "Print document" option from the "menu,"
which contains other options including "cOpy document," "Create document,"
"Revise document," and "Erase document." The items could be selected by
pressing the highlighted letter on the keyboard. These options are all part of the
program's user interface. Before examining the landmark case that first applied
the audiovisual copyright to the protection of the user interface for productivity
software, it would be helpful to look first at a pre-9Whelan decision that ad-
dressed a similar problem. 10 6
In Synercom Technology, Inc. v. University Computing Co. 10 7 the United
States District Court for the Northern District of Texas considered whether the
"sequence and ordering" of plaintiff's input formats used in a structural analysis
program was protected expression or an unprotected idea. Synercom furnished
its customers printed instructions describing the order in which data should be
entered. Because Synercom's program was a commercial success and was the
market leader, defendants tailored their program to accept input data in a se-
quence identical to that of plaintiff's program and provided its users with similar
printed input instructions. The court held that the sequence and ordering of
data for the input formats is inseparable from the idea underlying the formats
104. Id. at 857; see Amici Curiae Brief Relating to Copyright Issues and Protection of Look and
Feel of Computer Programs at 21, Broderbund Software, Inc. v. Unison World, Inc., 648 F. Supp.
1127 (N.D. Cal. 1986) (No. C85 3457).
105. See, ag., Davidson, The Whelan Decision: Missing the Middle Ground, 5 COMPUTER L.
REP. 335, 337 (1986); Letter by Henry Davis, "Look and Feel" Isn't Everything in This Case, BYTE,
July 1986, at 22; Russo and Derwin, Copyright in the "Look and Feel" of Computer Software, COM-
PUTER LAW., Feb. 1985, at 1.
106. Crucial for this discussion is the understanding that although the user interface is generated
by the underlying code, two entirely different codes can yield an identical user interface. See, e.g.,
Whelan, 797 F.2d at 1244 n.45 ("Different program codes in different computer languages are capa-
ble of producing identical screen outputs."). It is equally important to understand that two pro-
grams may look identical on the screen to the user, but the "guts" or code in one program may be
superior to the other (eg., faster, more efficient, less compiled code, etc.).
107. 462 F. Supp. 1003 (N.D. Tex. 1978).
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and therefore could not receive protection.108 As Judge Higginbotham ques-
tioned: "If sequencing and ordering is expression, what separable idea is
expressed?" 1o9
Although Synercom Technology based its complaint on a registered literary
copyright of its printed instruction forms, its facts are analogous to the audiovi-
sual copyright extended to plaintiff in Broderbund Software, Inc. v. Unison
World, Inc 110 The only difference in Broderbund was that the data entry in-
structions were displayed in menu screens generated by software. The input
formats in Synercom and the menus in Broderbund served the same function:
"[both] told the user what type of data to enter, where to place them and how to
use it.""1 1
Plaintiff Broderbund marketed a program for Apple computers called
"Print Shop," which assisted the user in the creation of customized greeting
cards, banners, posters, and signs that contain variable combinations of text,
graphics, and borders. Defendant Unison World, a company that specialized in
converting existing software to make it compatible with other computers, met
with Broderbund about the possibility of writing an IBM-compatible version of
Print Shop. Broderbund insisted that if Unison were to receive the right to con-
vert Print Shop, it had to "produce an exact reproduction of the original." 112
Plaintiff "very briefly" showed defendant the source code of the Print Shop pro-
gram, just so defendant could get a feel for the complexity of the project.11 3 Six
months later, Unison World began developing this specified imitation, but it did
so without access to plaintiff's source code. After substantial progress on the
written conversion of Print Shop, negotiations for the IBM rights broke down
and Unison World instructed its programmers to complete the project, but no
longer to confine themselves to producing an exact replica. Defendant's pro-
grammers enhanced their version of Print Shop by adding a calendar function, a
streamlining of certain design selections, and the ability to save various designs.
Unison World then marketed its program under the product trademark
"Printmaster."
108. The court in Whelan questioned the holding in Synercom: "To the extent that Synercom
rested on the premise that there was a difference between the copyrightability of sequence and form
in computer context and in any other context, we think that it is incorrect." Whelan, 797 F.2d. at
1240.
109. Synercom, 462 F. Supp. at 1013.
110. 648 F. Supp. 1127 (N.D. Cal. 1986). The court extended the copyright in the underlying
code to its audiovisual screen displays: "copyright protection is not limited to the literal aspects of a
computer program, but rather.., extends to the overall structure of a program, including its audio-
visual displays." Id. at 1133. Another federal court has rejected this approach by holding that the
audiovisual screen displays are separate works and may be registered separately. See Digital Com-
munications Assocs. v. Softklone Distributing Corp., 659 F. Supp. 449, 455 (N.D. Ga. 1987). To
settle the issue, the Copyright Office is currently considering adopting one of various registration
schemes. See Notice of Public Hearing Registration and Deposit of Computer Screen Displays, 52
Fed. Reg. 28,311 (1987) (Public Hearing September 9-10, 1987); Katchman, Copyright Registration
of Computer Screen Displays from the Perspective of the Copyright Office, COMPUThR LAW., Oct.
1987, at 16.
111. Broderbund, 648 F. Supp. at 1132.
112. Id. at 1130.
113. Id.
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Because defendant did not have access to the Print Shop source code during
the writing of its version of the program, plaintiff could not allege literary copy-
right infringement and instead charged that Unison World infringed Print
Shop's audiovisual copyright. Specifically, plaintiff maintained that Unison
World's version copied Print Shop's menu screens, input formats, and its se-
quencing of screens. Defendant argued that the Synercom rationale controlled
and that these input formats and menu options contained expression that was
indistinguishable from the idea expressed. However, the court was "persuaded
by the reasoning of Whelan" and concluded that "the separable idea of 'Print
Shop' is the creation of greeting cards, banners, posters and signs that contain
infinitely variable combinations of text, graphics, and borders."1 14 The Court
concluded: "A rival software publisher is completely free to market a program
with the same underlying idea, but it must express the idea through a substan-
tially different structure." 115 Because Broderbund offered evidence of another
competitor's program called "Stickybear Printer" which could produce similar
banners and greeting cards but had different menu screens that accomplished
essentially the same function as those of Print Shop, the court reasoned that "the
existence of 'Stickybear Printer' proves that there do exist other, quite different
ways of expressing the ideas embodied in 'Print Shop.' "116
One is no longer free "to make the machine do the same thing as it would if
it had the copyrighted work placed in it" even if "one's own creative effort" is
used. 1 7 It is unlikely that even the Whelan court would take its own words to
the Broderbund extreme: "The rule proposed here, which allows copyright pro-
tection beyond the literal computer code, would provide the proper incentive for
programmers by protecting their most valuable efforts, while not giving them a
stranglehold over the development of new computer devices that accomplish the
same end."1 18
Although some might argue that the existence of Stickybear Printer proves
that there was not a stranglehold over the development of new computer devices
that accomplish the same "general" end, the opinion seems to prohibit new pro-
grams that accomplish the exact or substantially similar end. Protecting a pro-
gram's exact end result, the "look and feel" or executable image of the software,
is potentially destructive to the competitive process and consumer welfare.
American society has long benefited from having the first successful market en-
trant set the industry standard, with other competitors soon following suit.
To provide an example in a non-computer context, when people first learn
to drive, they do not have to worry about whether the car is a Ford, Chrysler, or
Chevrolet, because the gas pedal is always going to be on the right, and the
brake will be on the left. The court in Synercom posed a similar analogy:
The familiar "figure-H" pattern of an automobile stick is chosen arbi-
114. Id. at 1133.
115. Id.
116. Id. at 1132.
117. CONTU REPORT, supra note 45, at 21.
118. Whelan, 797 F.2d at 1237 (emphasis added).
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trarily by an auto manufacturer. Several different patterns may be
imagined, some more convenient for the driver or easier to manufac-
ture than others, but all representing possible configurations. The pat-
tern chosen is arbitrary, but once chosen, it is the only pattern which
will work in a particular model. The pattern (analogous to the com-
puter "format") may be expressed in several different ways: by a prose
description in a driver's manual, through a diagram, photograph, or
driver training film, or otherwise. Each of these expressions may pre-
sumably be protected through copyright. But the copyright protects
copying of the particular expressions of the pattern, and does not pro-
hibit another manufacturer from marketing a car using the same pat-
tern. Use of the same pattern might be socially desirable, as it would
reduce the retraining of drivers. 19
In much the same way, copyright should not protect a program's user inter-
face. Businesses spend hundreds of millions of dollars each year training em-
ployees how to use word processors and spread sheets developed by the industry
leaders. If a competitor develops another word processor or spread sheet which
is offered at a lower price but which has a different appearance, and if the com-
petitor attempts to enter the industry leader's market, a business in need of addi-
tional copies would be foolish to purchase this new software because it would
have to retrain employees. The first developer can therefore keep prices high
and continually reap economic profits without being subjected to competitive
market forces. This constitutes an insurmountable barrier to entry and, in effect,
creates a long-term, patent-like monopoly in the software.
Imitation of industry leaders is a means of survival for competitors in all
industries. It now appears that a software company successful in setting an in-
dustry standard may be able to shield itself from any competition. Allowing
programmers to copyright the user interface in this manner is akin to allowing
the first developer of a car to exclude all others from placing a brake pedal to the
left of the gas pedal in a car. As one commentator suggested, "The software
developer needs the freedom to use the interface of another program, just as a
watchmaker might borrow the concept of a watch's face while revolutionizing
its clockworks."' 20 Moreover, consumers will be forced to continue paying ex-
orbitant prices for business software developed by the industry leaders.
Copying the clock's face was recently precluded in Digital Communications
Associates v. Sofiklone Distributing Corp. 121 The facts in this case were undis-
puted. During the early 1980s the original plaintiff in this action, Microstuff,
Inc., developed and marketed the "Crosstalk" asynchroneous data communica-
119. Synercom, 462 F. Supp. at 1013. Cf. Plains Cotton Coop. Ass'n v. Goodpasture Computer
Serv., 807 F.2d 1256, 1262 (5th Cir. 1987) (substantial similarity in organization and structure may
be dictated by various market factors).
120. Statement made by Daniel Bricklin, reported by David Sanger, A Divisive Lotus 'Clone
War', New York Times, Feb. 5, 1987, at 30.
121. 659 F. Supp. 449 (N.D. Ga. 1987). Although the Broderbund court concluded that the user
interface in question constituted an audiovisual work, the Digital court was of the opinion that the
productivity user interface was a literary work. Id. at 462. The court further held that the elements
of the menu screen were protected subject matter as a compilation. Id. at 463; see infra text accom-
panying note 147.
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tion system.122 The Crosstalk program, utilizing a microcomputer's modem and
the telephone lines, enabled its users to access information and data stored in
other microcomputers or in a remote mainframe computer. Although competi-
tors market similar communication packages that accomplish the same general
end, Crosstalk and its updates (or enhancements) have "been extremely success-
ful in the marketplace." 123
Defendant Softklone is a corporation created for the purpose of marketing
and distributing "clone" computer programs. 124 In 1985 after observing Cross-
talk's success, Softklone completed and began to market a program called "Mir-
ror" that essentially emulated the user interface of Crosstalk.125 Softklone did
not use or copy plaintiff's source code, but programmed its version indepen-
dently. The evidence at trial showed that Crosstalk XVI sold at retail for one
hundred ninety-five dollars, while Mirror was sold initially for just under fifty
dollars. 126
As usual the court had to struggle with what elements in the menu screen
constituted idea and what elements constituted expression. The court concluded
that the cloned elements of the program that were nonessential to program oper-
ation constituted the expression of Crosstalk and, therefore, were infringements.
For example, "first entering a 'SPeed' command and then entering a 'DAta'
command [on the main menu] has the same effect as first entering a 'DAta'
command and then entering a 'SPeed' command." The court determined that
the particular way the menu items were arranged was nonessential and therefore
protected. 127
This trend will likely continue. Lotus Development Corporation has re-
cently filed a lawsuit against Paperback Software International for allegedly
"cloning" or "identically recreating," with only "cosmetic or superficial varia-
tions, the essential user interface of Lotus 1-2-3. "128 There is no allegation that
Paperback copied the underlying code of 1-2-3, but only the program's familiar
grid-like screen appearance and the sequence of keystrokes used to manipulate
functions and information. Lotus 1-2-3 was first introduced in 1983 and has
122. In 1986 Microstuff waspurchased by Digital Communications Associates, Inc. Id. at 453.
123. Id. at 452.
124. Id. at 453.
125. Softklone's parent, ForeTec Development Corporation, actually first coded and began mar-
keting the Crosstalk clone. In August, 1985 ForeTec created Softklone, a wholly owned subsidiary,
to market and distribute "clone" computer programs such as the one in dispute. Id. It is essential to
note that Softklone did not have access to plaintiff's source code for Crosstalk. Softklone only had
access to the executable image, or machine language, and therefore had to independently code its
"Mirror."
126. See Smith and Elgison, DCA v. SoftKlon" The Continuing Saga of Copyright, Computers,
and Clones, COMPUTER LAW., April 1987, at 14.
127. Digital, 659 F. Supp. at 459. For a more thorough discussion of "compilations" and their
history, see infra text accompanying notes 134-46.
128. Lotus Dev. Corp. v. Paperback Software Int'l, No. 87-0076-K. (D. Mass., filed January 12,
1987) [hereinafter Lotus Complaint]. Lotus Development Corp. is also seeking to preclude another
competitor from marketing its Lotus clone called "The Twin." See Lotus Dev. Corp. v. Mosaic
Software, Inc., No. 87-0074-K (D. Mass., amended complaint ified March 6, 1987) ("The Twin" is
advertised as being "amazingly similar" to Lotus 1-2-3); Apple Computer, Inc. v. Microsoft Corp.,
(N.D. Cal., complaint filed March 17, 1988); Apple's Copyright Lawsuit is Seen as Effort to Lock in
Technical Lead, Wall Street Journal, March 21, 1988, at 23 col.4.
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since been near or at the top of best-seller lists for software. Because Paperback's
version, called "VP Planner," carries a list price of only one hundred dollars,
while 1-2-3 costs approximately four hundred ninety-five dollars, one can easily
understand Lotus's concern. The user manual for "VP Planner" does not hide
the fact that it has copied the industry standard set by 1-2-3, but instead empha-
sizes this fact in its marketing: "VP Planner works just like 1-2-3. The com-
mands and the way you enter and manipulate your data are the same." 129
Given the current state of the law, Lotus Development Corporation will likely
win its suit against Paperback Software, further eroding the competitive process
in the computer software industry.
A potentially far-reaching change in the 1976 Copyright Act was the grant
to an author of the exclusive right to make and to authorize any "derivative
works based upon the copyrighted work." 130 A derivative work is defined as
any "work based upon one or more preexisting works, such as... abridgment,
condensation, or any other form in which a work may be recast, transformed, or
adapted." 13 1
This definition may imply that more than the literal aspects of a program's
code is protected.1 32 Although a work evidently is not derivative unless it has
been substantially copied from a prior work, 133 it is difficult to imagine how any
business or productivity software that uses similar menu screens and keystrokes
could overcome such scrutiny. In Lotus, for example, it will be difficult for Pa-
perback to argue that its "clone" is not "based upon" 1-2-3 and has not been
"recast," "adapted," or "transformed" into its own version.
Lotus Development Corporation, the undisputed spread sheet marketing
leader, has reaped millions in profits from its development of 1-2-3. Several
years transpired before a competitor was able to market a program that accom-
129. Lotus Complaint, supra note 128, at count I, para. 22.
130. 17 U.S.C. § 106 (1982). Other "exclusive rights" in a copyrighted work include the right to
copy, distribute, perform, and display the work. Id.
131. Id. § 101.
132. As was concluded in Whelan:
Although the Code does not use the terms "sequence," "order" or "structure," it is clear
from the definition of compilations and derivative works, and the protection afforded them,
that Congress was aware of the fact that the sequencing and ordering of materials could be
copyrighted, Le., that the sequence and order could be parts of the expression, not the idea,
of a work.
Whelan, 797 F.2d at 1239. Compare the definition of "derivative work" with what Professor Nim-
mer calls "Comprehensive Nonliteral Similarity," 3 M. NIMMER, supra note 43, at § 13.03[A][1].
Generally, if the overall structure of the defendant's work has been copied, not just the literal as-
pects, the "substantial similarity" test will be satisfied under this approach. See Nichols v. Universal
Pictures Corp., 45 F.2d 119 (2d Cir. 1930), cert. denied, 282 U.S. 902 (1931); see also Midway Mfg.
Co. v. Artic Int'l, Inc., 704 F.2d 1009 (7th Cir.) (video game "speed-up" kit, which directs the
characters to move in different ways, constitutes a derivative work), cert. denied, 464 U.S. 823
(1983). The extent of legal protection afforded derivative works, however, remains unclear in the
computer software context. See Digital Communications Assocs. v. Softklone Distributing Corp.,
659 F. Supp. 449, 463 (N.D. Ga. 1987) (court describes application of derivative work in computer
screen context a "thorny issue"); Hazen, Contract Principles as a Guide for Protecting Intellectual
Property Rights in Computer Software: The Limits of Copyright Protection, The Evolving Concept of
Derivative Works, and Proper Limits of Licensing Arrangements, 20 U.C. DAVIs L. REv. 105, 108
(1986).
133. See 3 M. NIMMER, supra note 43, § 3.01.
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plishes virtually the same end result. In hindsight, the economic incentive that
Lotus would need to create such a product has been realized for years.
Although any further protection would result in economic waste, the current
status of copyright law forces a court to side with Paperback or ignore the ex-
press wording of the copyright law.
b. Compilations and the Idea-Expression Inconsistency
Since the decision in Baker v. Selden,1 3 4 legal scholars have been lulled into
a false sense of security that the idea-expression analysis always leads to correct
results. "Idea-expression"-what does it mean? The words themselves epito-
mize a subjective amorphousness that escapes precise definition. Until its appli-
cation to the visual screens produced by computer software, idea-expression was
usually a term used by courts to support their socially beneficial opinions.
If the goal is to achieve a socially optimal and competitive outcome, the
idea-expression dichotomy is incompatible with computer software protection.
As this section will demonstrate, the fundamental gap in copyright law is that
the Baker v. Selden idea-expression dichotomy often fails in the essential pur-
pose of intellectual property protection: to reward authors and inventors for a
limited time in an amount commensurate with the value of their works to soci-
ety. The Supreme Court in Mazer v. Stein 135 suggested the same economic goal:
The economic philosophy behind the clause empowering Con-
gress to grant [intellectual property protection] is the conviction that
encouragement of individual effort by personal gain is the best way to
advance public welfare through the talents of authors and inventors in
"Science and useful Arts." Sacrificial days devoted to such creative
activities deserve rewards commensurate with the services rendered. 136
To understand the "incompatibility" conclusion reached by this Comment, one
must trace the development of copyright law back to the time the idea-expres-
sion threshold test was first introduced to fact-based works.
At one end of the spectrum of protected works under the copyright law is a
novel or play. The author has the incentive to write a novel because the value of
her efforts are embodied in what copyright law clearly considers "expression."
Consumers purchase Hemingway's works because they like to read the unique
and descriptive stories or expressions that are embodied in the works. There-
fore, protecting the expression directly compensates the author for the fruits of
his labor and copyright idea-expression analysis works well.
At the other end of the spectrum are fact-based works such as maps, direc-
tories, and news and historical accounts. The true value embodied in a map, for
example, comes from surveying the land and determining proper elevations and
boundaries. Society benefits from the mapmaker's efforts and should therefore
reward him accordingly. However, after this information is gathered, the result-
134. 101 U.S. 99 (1879); see supra text accompanying notes 42-44.
135. 347 U.S. 201 (1954).
136. Id. at 219.
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ing geographic dimensions become facts or ideas that, standing alone, do not
merit protection under copyright law. In theory, others are free to take these
facts and use them in their own maps, thus reaping the benefit of the first
mapmaker's labor.137
Faced with the inevitable consequence that the exploration of new geo-
graphical areas would cease, United States Court of Appeals for the Third Cir-
cuit insinuated that copyright law requires "sweat of the brow": "[T]he
presentation of information available to everybody, such as is found on maps, is
protected only when the publisher of the map in question obtains originally
some of that information by the sweat of his own brow" because "[a]most any-
body could combine the information from several maps onto one map, but not
everybody can go out and get that information originally and then transcribe it
into a map." 138
Although most courts have steadfastly adhered to the traditional principle
that the amount of labor expended in producing a work in a copyright infringe-
ment action is irrelevant, 139 "sweat of the brow" reasoning is evident in cases
that involve the protection of factual compilations. 140 Although courts first
have had to struggle with how to extricate themselves from the copyright limita-
tion that ideas are in the public domain, they have invariably denied copyright-
ability to works of free-riders. In Adventures in Good Eating, Inc. v. Best Places
to Eat, Inc., 141 for example, the United States Court of Appeals for The Seventh
Circuit affirmed the validity of a copyright in a directory listing of fine restau-
rants. 142 Although the individual restaurant names were facts/ideas, the court
explained, "[a]ny person may produce a dire&ory of restaurants, but he must
'start from scratch,' do his own collecting, his own appraisal, and his own de-
scription and editing." 143
137. When the idea and expression are indistinguishable and merge, no copyright protection
exists. See, eg., Herbert Rosenthal Jewelry Corp. v. Kalpakian, 446 F.2d 738, 742 (9th Cir. 1971)
(denying copyright protection for the expression ofjewel-encrusted "bee" pin because it could not
distinguish the idea from the expression).
138. Amsterdam v. Triangle Publications, Inc., 189 F.2d 104, 106 (3d Cir. 1951). In Donald v.
Zack Meyer's T.V. Sales and Serv., 426 F.2d 1027 (5th Cir. 1970), the court held that a common
legal form was not copyrightable because its creators expended only "negligible efforts." Id. at 1031.
The court justified its holding under the copyright law by concluding that the works were not "origi-
nal" works under section 102(a) of the Copyright Act. Id.; see 17 U.S.C. § 102(a). For in-depth
discussions of copyright protection of facts, see Denicola, Copyright in Collections of Facts: A Theory
for the Protection of Nonfiction Literary Works, 81 COLUM. L. Rav. 516 (1981); Gorman, Copyright
Protection for the Collection and Representation of Facts, 76 HARV. L. REV. 1569 (1963); see also
United States v Hamilton, 583 F.2d 448, 452 (9th Cir. 1978) (synthesis from public sources and
independent observation in creating a map supports the validity of a copyright on the map).
139. See Rockford Map Publishers v. Directory Serv. Co., 768 F.2d 145, 148 (7th Cir. 1985)
("The copyright laws protect the work, not the amount of effort expended."); Eckes v. Card Prices
Update, 736 F.2d 859, 862 (2d Cir. 1984) ("the fruits of another's labor in lieu of independent
research obtained through the sweat of a researcher's brow, does not [usually] merit copyright pro-
tection ...."); Miller v. Universal City Studios, Inc., 650 F.2d 1365, 1369 (5th Cir. 1981).
140. The telephone directory cases are illustrative of this labor theory approach. See Rand Mc-
Nally & Co. v. Fleet Management Sys., 591 F. Supp. 726, 732 (N.D. Ill. 1983) (listing cases adhering
to this reasoning).
141. 131 F.2d 809 (7th Cir. 1942).
142. Id. at 815.
143. Id. at 812-13.
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The economic reality is that consumers who buy maps, for example, are not
paying solely for the unique colors and other methods of expression that the
mapmaker employs in representing various elevations and boundaries, but are
also rewarding the mapmaker for the ability, time, and expense exhausted to
gather the facts. The other features, such as the expressions implemented, gen-
erally have only minimal significance when compared to the value of the whole
work. People do not pay just for the expression-they are paying primarily for
the facts, the ideas.
If society only offered protection for the expression embodied in the map,
the mapmaker would be undercompensated for the fruits of his labor and society
would be discouraging the optimal level of geographical explorations. If geo-
graphical explorations and other fact-gathering is curtailed, then society loses.
This analysis leads to only two conclusions, both of which point to the failure of
the idea-expression analysis in light of our economic objectives: either 1) it fails
from an economic perspective because we are not rewarding fact-gatherers in an
amount commensurate to the entire value of their efforts to society and thus are
discouraging their efforts (society is only rewarding expression); or 2) it fails
because we are rewarding fact-gatherers for the entire value of the work (which
is embodied in both the idea and expression).
Courts generally circumvent the idea-expression dichotomy and thereby re-
ward fact-gatherers by protecting, as expression, the unique arrangement and
order that has been implemented by the gatherer to display the facts on a printed
page. 144 Here lies the fundamental downfall in software cases: merely protect-
ing the arrangements only indirectly compensates the gatherer of the informa-
tion. Refusing to expressly reward the time and effort expended in gathering the
facts leads to an improper outcome when applied to the output of software.
The 1976 Copyright Act embodies this fact-based/idea-expression analysis
by including "compilations" within its purview. 145 A compilation is "a work
formed by the collection and assembling of preexisting materials or of data that
are selected, coordinated, or arranged in such a way that the resulting work as a
whole constitutes an original work of authorship." 14 6
The Digital court correctly concluded that the items on the Crosstalk
"Main Menu" status screen were arranged so as to constitute an "original work
of authorship." 147 Most business/productivity related computer displays or
menus, including that of Lotus 1-2-3, satisfy the definition of compilation under
the copyright law. Accordingly, although giving competitors the right to inde-
144. See West Publishing Co. v. Mead Data Central, Inc., 799 F.2d 1219, 1227 (8th Cir. 1986)
(LEXIS's appropriation of page references from West's legal case reports would infringe West's
copyright in arrangement).
145. 17 U.S.C. § 103 (1982).
146. 17 U.S.C. § 101 (1982).
147. See Digital, 659 F. Supp. at 463 ("[l[he status screen is a 'compilation' of parameter/
command terms."). "Originality" has been interpreted to be a very minimal threshold requirement
to copyrightability: "The standard for 'originality' is minimal. It is not necessary that the work be
novel or unique, but only that the work have its origin with the author-that it be independently
created." West Publishing, 799 F.2d at 1223.
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pendently copy the look and feel of productivity software is socially desirable,
doing so would contravene a correct application of copyright law.
The inherent difference between compilations in computer screen displays
and traditional fact-based infringements against maps or directories is that for a
programmer to implement the menu or visual display of a market leader's prod-
uct without copying the underlying code, he must accomplish this task by cod-
ing independently, by the "sweat of the brow." In other words, the defendant in
Digital went out and surveyed the land but was denied the right to make the
map. Or, using a previous illustration, the defendant in Digital independently
developed the internal mechanics of a clock by "the sweat of the brow" but was
denied the right to copy the clock's face. Such a result would not have occurred
with traditional fact-based work cases. As the court in Rand McNally & Co. v.
Fleet Management Systems 148 explained after discussing past compilation cases
in a non-software context: "None of the above cases disputes one's right to com-
pile a list of facts through one's own labor." 149
In search of a copyright solution, one might argue that similar productivity
software is fair use and falls under the express limitation on the exclusive rights
under section 107.150 Applying the Lotus facts, however, it is disingenuous to
argue that Paperback copied the user interface of 1-2-3 for "purposes such as
criticism, comment, news reporting, teaching .... scholarship, or research.' 151
To the contrary, Lotus 1-2-3 was copied because it was the spreadsheet leader,
the state of the art in business software, and was reaping handsome economic
profits. Paperback's purposes included economic commercial gain and all the
other motivations commonly associated with the dynamic market structure.
Furthermore, the relative low price of "VP Planner" would have the effect of
driving down the price of 1-2-3, thus diminishing its commercial value.
Although Paperback's motivations may not seem as altruistic as teaching, schol-
148. 591 F. Supp. 726 (N.D. Ill. 1983).
149. Id. at 733.
150. 17 U.S.C. § 107 (1982). The factors to be considered for determining whether the infringe-
ment constitutes fair use are as follows:
(1) the purpose and character of the use, including whether such use is of a commercial
nature or is for nonprofit educational purposes;
(2) the nature of the copyrighted work;
(3) the amount and substantiality ofthe portion used in relation to the copyright work as a
whole; and
(4) the effect of the use upon the potential market for or value of the copyrighted work.
Id. Probably the most famous fair use defense was used in Sony Corp. of Am. v. Universal City
Studios, Inc., 464 U.S. 417 (1984). Universal, owners of copyrights on some of the television pro-
grams that are broadcast on the public airwaves, claimed that Sony's video cassette recorders
(VCRs), which enabled owners to record the programs, assisted users in copyright infringement. Id.
at 420. The Court held that this use constituted fair use because the average user of the public uses
VCRs for "time shifting" purposes and such usage would not impair the commercial value of plain-
tiff's copyrights. Id. at 456; see also Harper & Row Publishers v. Nation Enterprises, 471 U.S. 539
(1985) (when defendant's copy undermines or diminishes the value of the copyrighted work, fair use
is not a defense).
A parody may constitute fair use, but one can only take from the copyrighted work enough to
conjure up the original. See Elsmere Music, Inc. v. National Broadcasting Co., 482 F. Supp. 741,
747 (S.D.N.Y), aff'd, 623 F.2d 252 (2d Cir. 1980); Columbia Pictures Corp. v. National Broadcast-
ing Co., 137 F. Supp. 348, 354 (S.D. Cal. 1955).
151. 17 U.S.C. § 107 (1982).
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arship, or research, its function as a competitor is just as important to our soci-
ety. Nevertheless, section 107 and its fair use defense are not the solution.
C. Summary
The Whelan and SAS courts battled with copyright semantics to reach eq-
uitable results in software cases involving alleged infringements of the underly-
ing program code. In doing so the courts distorted copyright law by crossing
the idea-expression threshold.
Recent cases involve infringement actions against competitors who have
copied the user interface. Although Broderbund's application of the audiovisual
copyright to nonfanciful, productivity visual displays is questionable, like pro-
tection is certainly available as a compilation (or possibly as a derivative work)
under the copyright law. As has been shown, however, a correct application of
the copyright law in computer software compilation cases leads to anticompeti-
tive results. All these decisions point to the incompatibility of copyright protec-
tion for computer software.
The current trend in computer software disputes is to provide protection
that far exceeds that which is needed to stimulate innovation and creativity.1 52
Furthermore, the increased protection sidesteps constitutional guidelines in that
such a plan of protection discourages rather than promotes the "Progress of
Science and useful Arts."'1 53
II. A NEw SCHEME OF PROTECTION
Although the application of our intellectual property rules has
been adjusted over time in response to changing commercial practice
and evolving technologies, the continuing stream of the new scientific
advances calls for rethinking the very concepts derived from earlier
centuries on which those rules are based. New concepts of what intel-
lectual property is and how it should be protected-beyond patents,
trademarks, trade secrets, and copyrights-may well be needed, as well
as sweeping changes in intellectual property laws and the way they are
administered and enforced.154
This statement, made in a report by The President's Commission of Indus-
trial Competitiveness, reflects a growing awareness that copyright law is incom-
patible with computer software protection. Technology has outgrown the law
that was first developed for pure literary works. The direction software develop-
ment is taking indicates that copyright application will become even more troub-
lesome in the future as "artificial intelligence" becomes commonplace in our
152. As stated by CONTU, "[Clopyright should not grant anyone more economic power than is
necessary to achieve the incentive to create." CONTU REPORT, supra note 45, at 12.
153. U.S. CONST., art. I, § 8, cl. 8.
154. OTA REPORT, supra note 91, at 61 (quoting GLOBAL CoMPETrrIoN: THE NEW REALITY,
The President's Commission on Industrial Competitiveness, January 1985 Appendix D, "A Special
Report on the Protection of Intellectual Property Rights," at 305).
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society. 155 This new generation of software is designed to make the computer
mimic the human brain. Computers will be able to interpret the visual environ-
ment, drive cars, and will even be able to learn. Computers are actually becom-
ing intelligent. Programs are being written that, in turn, will independently
generate new programs. Within the next decade programs will be able to write
poetry. Can machines be "authors" under the copyright law? Are machine pro-
duced expressions protected?
This Comment has demonstrated that even a correct application of copy-
right law leads to anticompetitive results. Although it may be true that rejection
of the idea-expression dichotomy could lead to protection for ideas, the result
would not necessarily be objectionable. Essentially, the approach offered in this
Comment is the same as that which drives a free-market economy: if the under-
lying idea of the software is useful to society, then that idea will be insulated by
the market-but only for a limited time. This exclusive monopoly duration will
be equal to the time it takes the idea to become successful in the marketplace,
together with the time it takes another person to implement the same idea (com-
monly referred to as the "lead time"). 156
Consider the situation in Lotus and DigitaL If Lotus 1-2-3 and Crosstalk
had not been based on ideas that were useful to society, then the products would
not have been successful in the marketplace and the ideas, although still pro-
tected, would be in a state of perpetual uselessness. However, because the prod-
ucts were based on ideas that were particularly useful to society, as evidenced by
handsome profits, they have been protected by an exclusive monopoly for a du-
ration equal to the time it takes a competitor to implement the same end-result.
Once competitors drive the price of the successful software down to the cost of
production, monopoly power ends.
There is no need to grant a fixed monopoly of fifty years plus the life of the
author to provide the incentive needed to stimulate creative and inventive
software in the marketplace.157 The copyright system as applied to computer
software is inherently foolish because it protects all works for the same duration
without focusing on the usefulness to society. The free market provides a per-
fectly variable system that grants a monopoly according to the product's useful-
ness. If a product is extremely useful, the monopoly may be short-lived but the
economic reward during this period will be great.
Congress should dismantle copyright protection of computer software in
favor of a marketplace approach. Students of basic microeconomics will recog-
nize that the system described herein is essentially the same one that drives all
unregulated industries: Adam Smith's "invisible hand." If property rights are
adequately defined, protected, and transferable, the invisible hand will ensure
155. See generally Nycum and Fong, Artificial Intelligence And Certain Resulting Legal Issues,
COMPUTER LAW., May 1985, at 1.
156. See generally Breyer, The Uneasy Case For Copyright: A Study of Copyright in Books, Photo-
copies, and Computer Programs, 84 HARV. L. REV. 281, 300 (1970) (lead time provides protections
for the original authors of books which partially obviates the need for copyright protection).
157. For any work created on or after Jan. 1, 1978, the copyright monopoly is for 50 years after
the life of the author or 75 years for an "anonymous" work. 17 U.S.C. § 302 (1982).
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that resources flow to their most valuable uses. 158
Although copyright's long term monopoly would be taken away, it is essen-
tial that software be adequately protected. Judge Posner illustrates the problems
that a society would face in the absence of property rights:
A farmer plants corn, fertilizes it, and erects scarecrows, but when the
corn is ripe his neighbor reaps and sells it. The farmer has no legal
remedy against his neighbor's conduct since he owns neither the land
that he sowed nor the crop. After a few such incidents the cultivation
of land will be abandoned and the society will shift to methods of sub-
sistence (such as hunting) that involve less preparatory investment. 159
Although software is less tangible than the real property described in the above
hypothetical, providing exclusive rights is equally essential for all types of prop-
erty. Without protection, software developers would be unwilling to invest their
time and money and start-up companies would find it impossible to acquire ven-
ture capital. The protection needs to be both certain and predictable.
The remainder of this Comment proposes a marketplace system of protec-
tion for software and discusses how it would be implemented. 160 Generally, the
scheme relies on contract law, the same law that is implemented to drive our
market economy. Trade secret and trademark law provide additional protection.
Further, it employs a federal misappropriation law that serves to protect a first
developer's legitimate lead time.
A. Contract, Trademark, and Trade Secret 161
The software industry is already taking the marketplace initiative by pro-
158. R. POSNER, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAW 29 (2d ed. 1977).
159. Id. at 27.
160. Although copyright law has undergone little dynamic alteration, Congress has made subtle
changes to respond to problems in copyright law when applied to technology subject matter. See
Semiconductor Chip Protection Act of 1984, Pub. L. No. 98-620, § 302, 98 Stat. 3335, 3347 (codified
at 17 U.S.C. §§ 901-914 (Supp. IV 1986)); Note, A Chip Off the Old Block- Copyright Law and the
Semiconductor Chip Protection Act, 7 COMPUTER LJ. 245, 255-58 (1986).
161. This Comment does not examine closely the various contractual, trademark, and trade
secret methods that can be utilized for the protection of computer software. Other writers have
thoroughly commented on the effectiveness, validity, and methods of implementation of these forms
of protection.
For a discussion of the protection of software under contract law, see M. ScoTr, supra note 36,
at §§ 5.32-6.124; R. RAYSMAN & P. BROWN, supra note 30, at §§ 7.01-.13A; S. MANDELL, supra
note 22, at 8-16; Hazen, supra note 132.
For an overview of the protection of software under trademark law, see Trademark Act of 1946
(Lanham Act), as amended, 15 U.S.C.A. §§ 1051-1127 (1982) (§ 1120 provides that any person
damaged by the use of any false description or representation has a cause of action); J. LATSCH,
AMERICAN STANDARD HANDBOOK OF SOFTWARE LAW, at 197-216 (1985); J. MCCARTHY,
TRADEMARKS AND UNFAIR COMPETITION (1973).
For a general discussion of trade secret protection of software, see 12A R. MILGRIM, BUSINESS
ORGANIZATIONS, R. MILGRIM ON TRADE SECRETS §§ 2.06A[5], 2.09[5] (1981); OTA REPORT,
supra note 91, at 87-88; R. RAYSMAN & P. BROWN, supra note 30, at §§ 6.01-.05A; M. ScoTT, supra
note 36, at §§ 5.1-.28; Bender, Protection of Computer Programs" The Copyright/Trade Secret
Interface, 47 Prrr. L. REv. 907 (1986); Bender, Trade Secret Protection of Software, 38 GEo. WASH.
L. REV. 909 (1970); Conley & Bryan, supra note 53, at 573-77.
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tecting computer programs through contractual agreements with consumers. 162
Discouraged by the uncertainty of copyright protection, software producers en-
sure protection for their creations through contracts that explicitly identify the
rights of a purchaser or licensee.
Most software today is distributed under contract lease or license arrange-
ments in which the user does not buy all ownership rights of the program, but
purchases only the right to use it.' 63 In smaller, more specialized markets in
which software is generally more expensive, it is cost effective for the software
producer and users to negotiate contractual terms on an individual basis.
Problems arise, however, in the mass marketing of lower priced software. Nego-
tiating individual contracts would be cost prohibitive given the large number of
purchasers and the low price. Vendors of mass-market programs therefore have
relied on "shrink-wrap" licenses: the vendor displays the terms of the licensing
contract on the cover of the package containing the disk and the user is theoreti-
cally bound by its terms if the package is opened.' 64 Because these agreements
are not signed, their enforceability is unclear. 165 Realizing that software needs
to be both protected and freely transferable, some states have passed statutes
that specifically validate the use of these agreements. 166
Trademarks are devices used by a producer to identify her goods, thereby
distinguishing them from goods sold by others. Trademark protection becomes
extremely crucial if competitors are allowed to independently code programs
that are clones of the market leaders. Programs that may duplicate the user
interface of Lotus 1-2-3, for example, may be inferior in terms of speed of execu-
tion or size of compiled code. Trademarks enable consumers who want to pay
for these features to distinguish between the products. Trademarks, ser-
vicemarks, and trade names also eliminate some information costs because con-
sumers often know what kind of quality and service to expect from particular
vendors. 167
A developer also may protect software as a trade secret if the software is
162. See OTA REPORT, supra note 91, at 89. Fifty-four percent of the public favors the market-
place approach to resolving problems associated with intellectual property protection. Id.
163. Copyright law protects against making copies of software. It does not, however, prohibit
use. Contract arrangements have therefore been essential to elucidate the rights that a user
purchases and the rights that a developer retains.
164. Also commonly referred to as "tear-open" or "blister pack" licensing agreements.
165. See Note, Tear-Me-Open Software License Agreements: A Uniform Commercial Code Per-
spective on an Innovative Contract of Adhesion, 7 COMPUTER L.J. 261, 270-71 (1986); Note, The
Protection of Computer Software Through Shrink-Wrap License Agreements, 42 WASH. & LEE L.
REv. 1347 (1985); see also Guilbert, Louisiana Software License Enforcement Act Under the Scrutiny
of a Louisiana District Court: What Impact on Shrink Wrap License Agreements? 5 COMPUTER L.
REP. 840, 843 (1987) (at common law or under the Uniform Commercial Code, beginning perform-
ance may be deemed acceptance of the terms of the contract).
166. See Illinois Software License Enforcement Act, Ill. Rev. Stat. CL 29 Par. 801-808 (1986);
Louisiana Software License Enforcement Act, LA. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 51:1961-1966 (West 1984).
But see Vault Corp. v. Quaid Software Ltd., 655 F. Supp. 750, 762 (E.D. La. 1987) (court held that
Louisiana's statute was preempted by federal copyright law, 17 U.S.C. § 301).
167. Critics also recognize the disadvantages of trademark protection. Primarily, it encourages
excessive advertising expenditures to develop brand loyalty. Strong brand loyalty can be a formida-
ble barrier to entry. For an analysis of the role and effectiveness of trademarks in our economy, see
Backman, The Role of Trademarks in Our Competitive Economy, 58 TRADEMARK REP. 219 (1968).
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used in a business and it gives that business an opportunity to obtain an advan-
tage over competitors who do not know or use the software. 168 To succeed on
the merits of a trade secret claim, plaintiff must show that (1) it possessed a
trade secret 169 and (2) defendant used that trade secret in breach of an agree-
ment, confidence, or duty, or as a result of discovery by improper means. 170
Trade secret law is a creature of state statutory and common law. 17 1 Ac-
cordingly, state law defines what a trade secret is and what rights it affords. 17 2
Although others can develop the same trade secret, they must not do so with the
aid of an unauthorized disclosure nor by obtaining the secret through improper
means.
B. Federal Misappropriation
Federal misappropriation should be used only as a last resort. Circum-
stances may arise, however, that will escape the grasp of contract, trademark,
and trade secret law even though the equities will demand relief. Evaluations of
which party is "good" and which party is "bad" are embedded in the dictum of
many opinions. Courts have also been troubled when a competitor seeks to reap
the benefit of another's labor without expending similar effort. A federal law of
misappropriation would explicitly recognize some of these concerns. The pur-
pose of this law is twofold. First, it provides a federal forum; second, and more
important, it protects the legitimate lead time into the marketplace of a first
developer.
Federal misappropriation would be rooted in a well-established common
law extension of unfair competition law that protects against unauthorized tak-
ing of valuable intangible assets that do not otherwise enjoy protection under
copyright, patent, or trademark law. 173 This doctrine, known under the rela-
tively vague label of "common law misappropriation," allows a court to grant
equitable relief without creating a broad monopoly. 174
Common law misappropriation was first pronounced by the United States
168. RESTATEMENT OF TORTS § 757 comment b (1939).
169. The factors to be considered in determining whether claimant has a trade secret include the
following:
(1) the extent to which the information is known outside of his business; (2) the extent to
which it is known by employees and others involved in his business; (3) the extent of meas-
ures taken by him to guard the secrecy of the information; (4) the value of the information
to him and to his competitors; (5) the amount of effort or money expended by him in
developing the information; and (6) the ease or difficulty with which the information could
be properly acquired or duplicated by others.
Id.
170. RESTATEMENT OF TORTS § 757 (1937).
171. See, eg., N.C. GEN. STAT. § 66-152 (1985).
172. The United States Supreme Court held that patent law does not preempt states' trade secret
law. See Kewanee Oil Co. v. Bicron Corp., 416 U.S. 470 (1974).
173. See United States Golf Ass'n v. St. Andrews Sys., Data-Max, Inc., 749 F.2d 1028, 1034-35
(3d Cir. 1984).
174. Reback & Hayes, Copyright Gone Astray: The Misappropriation Alternative, COMPUTER
LAW., April 1986, at 3 (suggesting common law misappropriation doctrine is a desirable way to deal
with intellectual property not falling under the copyright act). See generally Franklin, Misappropria-
tion Law, Copyright Law, and Product Compatibility, COMPUTER LAW., Feb. 1987, at 8.
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Supreme Court in International News Service v. Associated Press.175 The Associ-
ated Press (A.P) employed reporters who gathered and prepared news to be
printed in member newspapers and posted on bulletin boards for the public to
read. Defendant International News Service (INS) copied these stories from the
bulletin boards and from early editions of AP's newspapers and sold them after a
careful revision of the expression. Although AP expended all of the effort and
absorbed all the cost of gathering and investigating the "hot" news items, INS
was often able to take these AP stories directly from bulletin boards on the east
coast and publish them on the west coast ahead of AP's publication there. The
Court recognized that this practice did not fall under copyright law which was
not "intended to confer upon one who might happen to be the first to report a
historic event the exclusive right for any period to spread the knowledge of
it."1 76 Nevertheless, the Court refused to let such an unfair practice continue:
[The] defendant, by its very act, admits that it is taking material that
has been acquired by complainant as the result of organization and the
expenditure of labor, skill, and money, and which is salable by com-
plainant for money, and that defendant in appropriating it and selling
it as its own is endeavoring to reap where it has not sown, and by dis-
posing of it to newspapers that are competitors of complainant's mem-
bers is appropriating to itself the harvest of those who have sown....
[A] court of equity ought not to hesitate long in characterizing it as
unfair competition in business. 177
Because the misappropriation doctrine was first promulgated by the
Supreme Court in a diversity case and its decision was based on federal common
law, with the subsequent decision in Erie Railroad Co. v. Tompkins 178 the doc-
trine has lost its binding authority. Nevertheless, common law misappropriation
still has significance in state courts and is considered a branch of unfair competi-
tion law.17 9 The misappropriation doctrine has been substantially limited by
cases recognizing that when the states provide a broader scope of protection
175. 248 U.S. 215 (1918). See 2 L. ALTMAN & R. CALLMANN, UNFAIR COMPETITION, TRADE-
MARKS, AND MONOPOLIES Ch.15 (1981); J. MCCARTHY, supra note 161, at §§ 10.23-.35; Callmann,
He Who Reaps Where He Has Not Sown: Unjust Enrichment in the Law of Unfair Competition, 55
HARV. L. REV. 595 (1942); Sell, The Doctrine of Misappropriation in Unfair Competition, 11 VAND,
L. REv. 483 (1958); Note, Unfair Competition: Application to News Service, 4 CORNELL L.Q. 223
(1919); Note, Property in News, 32 HARV. L. REv. 566 (1919); Note, Unfair Competition, 17 MICH.
L. REV. 490 (1919); Note, Misappropriation as Unfair Competition, 6 SYRACUSE L. REV. 317 (1955);
Note, 28 YALE L.J. 387 (1919).
176. International News Service, 248 U.S. at 234.
177. Id. at 239-40 (emphasis added).
178. 304 U.S. 64 (1938).
179. Misappropriation has been an actionable ground for relief in the state courts in various
noncomputer contexts. See, eg., Standard & Poor's Corp. v. Commodity Exchange, Inc., 683 F.2d
704 (2d Cir. 1982) (applying New York law and holding that the use of Standard & Poor's 500 Index
for futures contracts is prohibited); Columbia Broadcasting Sys. v. Melody Recordings, Inc., 134
N.J. Super. 368, 341 A.2d 348 (1975) (concerning record piracy which is now covered by copyright
statute); Pottstown Daily News Publishing Co. v. Pottstown Broadcasting Co., 411 Pa. 383, 192
A.2d 657 (1963) (news context); Southwestern Broadcasting Co. v. Oil Center Broadcasting Co., 210
S.W.2d 230 (Tex. Civ. App. 1947) (broadcast context).
In computer contexts a state law misappropriation claim has been held preempted by federal
copyright law. See Videotronics, Inc. v. Bend Electronics, 564 F. Supp. 1471 (D. Nev. 1983);
Synercom Technology, Inc. v. University Computing Co., 474 F. Supp. 37 (N.D. Tex. 1979).
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than an applicable federal statute, the federal law must preempt the state law
under the supremacy clause of the Constitution.18 0
A "federal misappropriation statute would alleviate this preemption prob-
lem. Such a federal statute should be enacted, specifically taking computer
software out of the copyright domain and placing it in the realm of federal mis-
appropriation. A claim for federal misappropriation would consist of three ele-
ments:18 1 1) the coding of a valuable software program through extensive effort
and skill and with the expectation of profit; 2) the appropriation of that software
by the defendant at little or no cost, thereby gaining an unfair competitive ad-
vantage in a way in which the court can characterize defendant's action as
"reaping where it has not sown"; and 3) economic harm to the owner of the
original software directly caused by the wrongful appropriation.
In addition, the statute would implement the following mandatory
guidelines:
1) A showing of enough similarity between two works to consti-
tute federal misappropriation is a difficult burden for plaintiff. A claim
that defendant copied or translated the plaintiff's program line-by-line
(of the program's entire code, of a substantial amount of the entire
code, or of an important procedure or function) either in the object
code level, the assembler level, or at a higher level, is a clear showing
of misappropriation, absent some contract arrangement.
2) Implicit in every finding of misappropriation is a recognition
that defendant's actions would likely abate the incentive for the injured
party and others in a similar position to engage in similar software
development.
3) One is free to copy the "look and feel" (the user interface) of
productivity software. The executable image of entertainment
software, like the "PAC-MAN" game, also can be copied. However,
fanciful and artistic characteristics such as PAC-MAN's "gobbler"
may find protection under this section;
4) Every software developer is under a stringent duty to protect
software through contract. Any intentional distribution of software
unaccompanied by a contract identifying the rights and obligations of
the parties will be deemed a waiver of rights under the act.
5) Federal misappropriation legislation does not preempt state
trade secret claims nor claims falling under state trademark law.
Legislated federal law of misappropriation would preempt state misappro-
priation and would thereby provide a unified approach currently provided by the
copyright act but would do so without granting unnecessary monopolies that
stifle competition. 182 Paragraph four ensures that federal misappropriation is
180. U.S. CONST., art. VI, § 2; see Sears, Roebuck & Co. v. Stiffel Co., 376 U.S. 225 (1964);
Compco Corp. v. Day-Brite Lighting, Inc., 376 U.S. 234 (1964); cf. Goldstein v. California, 412 U.S.
546 (1973) (states free to provide protection for subject matter that does not come within the specific
federal statutory provisions) (holding later codified in section 301 of the Copyright Act).
181. See J. MCCARTHY, supra note 161, § 10:25, at 322; Hazen, supra note 132, at 137 (listing
basic elements considered in a state misappropriation claim); Reback & Hayes, supra note 174, at 3.
182. When the dispute involves a situation that is inherently federal, the courts can assert federal
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not merely a substitute for copyright law because it will encourage the parties to
individually define property rights by way of contract. The emphasis of protec-
tion would shift to the marketplace, but there would be a remedy against third
parties who shorten a first developer's lead time by unfairly competing. Further,
this is not common law misappropriation. Federal misappropriation has a simi-
lar rationale and goal, but this law is narrowly tailored for a specific subject
matter.
Courts would no longer be bound by precedent established for a completely
different type of intellectual property and would no longer need to participate in
semantic maneuvering to render equitable decisions. The implementation of this
federal scheme would also enable computer illiterate courts to rely less on deter-
mination of what a program's organization and structure entails, and would
shift their focus to areas in which they are versed; for example, the determina-
tion of whether or not a contract term has been breached or whether the parties
exhibited good faith and fair dealing.
C. An Application
It may be helpful to an understanding of this new scheme of protection to
apply it to several of the core cases discussed above. Apple Computer, Inc. v.
Franklin Computer Corp. 183 represents a clear case for application of federal
misappropriation. Franklin sought to compete with Apple by copying the un-
derlying code of Apple's operating system programs. The programs sold by
Franklin implemented code that was identical to that employed in the Apple
software. 184 One expert testified that the Franklin code was "unquestionably
copied from Apple and could not have been independently created.' 85 Frank-
lin did not even dispute that it copied the Apple programs. Instead, it attempted
to cover its misappropriation with the copyright law. The bulk of the opinion
dealt with whether a functional operating system program can receive copyright
protection and whether a program stored in ROM could be protected. The end
result, however, was that Franklin clearly reaped where it had not sown and as a
result thwarted Apple's lead time in the marketplace.
Although the amount of labor employed is not an element of copyright
infringement, the Apple court was rightly concerned that Franklin was attempt-
ing to benefit from the fruits of Apple's labor: "Apple estimated the 'works in
suit' took 46 man-months to produce at a cost of over $740,000, not including
common law authority. Illinois v. City of Milwaukee, Wisconsin, 406 U.S. 91, 103 (1972) (" 'It is
not uncommon for federal courts to fashion federal law where federal rights are concerned.'" (quot-
ing Textile Workers v. Lincoln Mills, 353 U.S. 448, 457 (1956)).
Compare this approach to the federal scheme that governs the clean up of hazardous waste.
This scheme includes two federal statutes and the application of traditional and evolving federal
common law principles. See United States v. Chem-Dyne Corp., 572 F. Supp. 802, 810 (S.D. Ohio
1983); The Resource Conservation Recovery Act of 1976, 42 U.S.C §§ 6901-6987 (1982); The Com-
prehensive Environmental Response, Compensation, and Liability Act of 1980 (CERCLA), 42
U.S.C. §§ 9601-9657 (1982).
183. 714 F.2d 1240 (3rd Cir. 1983), cert. dismissed, 464 U.S. 1033 (1984).
184. Id. at 1245.
185. Id.
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the time or cost of creating or acquiring earlier versions of the programs or the
expense of marketing the programs." 186 Franklin would not have been pre-
cluded from legitimately competing with Apple by independently coding its own
version of Apple's operating system that accomplished the same end result.
The "look and feel" cases are on the other end of the legitimate competition
spectrum. Defendants in Broderbund, Digital, and Lotus did not copy plaintiffs'
underlying code nor did they have access to the source;187 instead, they
"sweated at the brow" by independently coding programs that accomplished the
same end. This represents legitimate competition. In these cases defendants
never would have sought to compete unless plaintiffs' products were successful
and profitable. The market provided each plaintiff with a monopoly in both the
idea and the expression of the programs for a duration equal to the time it took
each product to become successful and the time it took defendants to indepen-
dently recreate plaintiffs' user interfaces. With all these software products the
monopoly duration without copyright amounted to several years. More impor-
tantly, however, plaintiffs were handsomely rewarded for their creative
endeavors.
Before applying this new scheme to the cases of SAS and Whelan, an under-
standing of how programs are marketed would be helpful. Most software is dis-
tributed in the object code form (or executable image). If a user purchases Lotus
1-2-3, for example, all that is received is the object code, not the source code.
Source code is only needed to modify, change, or enhance a program. There is
no excuse for allowing a nonowner of software to obtain, have access to, or even
see the program's source code without appropriate individual licensing arrange-
ments, nondisclosure agreements, or other contractual restrictions. When only
the object code is distributed competitors will not be able to curtail substantially
a first developer's lead time without making extensive verbatim copies or
translations. 188
186. Id.
187. The defendant in Broderbund was "briefly" shown the source code of the "Print Shop"
program so defendant could get a feel for the size and complexity of the project. Defendant, how-
ever, did not have access to the source code while programming its version. See Broderbund, 648 F.
Supp. at 1130.
188. Coincidence does not explain why the plaintiffs in software cases that alleged copyright
infringement of the organization and structure (as opposed to only verbatim copying) of the code
involved a defendant that had access to plaintiffs' source codes. Compare Apple, 714 F.2d 1240 (3d
Cir. 1983) (extensive verbatim copying but defendant only had access to object code), cert. dismissed,
464 U.S. 1033 (1984) with Whelan, 797 F.2d 1222 (3d Cir. 1986) (only copying of organization and
structure alleged but defendant had access to source), cert denied, 107 S. Ct. 877 (1987). If a com-
petitor only has access to the object code of a program, technical problems generally make it much
easier for her to write a new version to accomplish the same end result than to rely on the organiza-
tion and structure of the first developer's object code-unless verbatim copying occurs. See Appen-
dix.
An exaggerated fear exists in the legal community that recipients of the object code will reverse
engineer (or disassemble) the code, modify the resulting assembler code, reconstruct it into a high
level source, compile the source and sell the new object code, all at little or no cost relative to the
labor and expense employed by the original programmer. This belief is a fallacy. In reality, it is an
extremely difficult, laborious, and time-consuming task to take assembler code that has been disas-
sembled from object code and to reconstruct it into its original or similar high level source code. The
disassembled version of object code loses the original comments, the variable names, and the pro-
gram's logical groupings (or structure indentation). All are important to the understanding of the
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Whenever source code is distributed an alarm should sound. In the absence
of contractual provisions defining the licensee's use of the code, a first developer
will be without a remedy. In both SAS and Whelan defendants had access to
plaintiffs' source code. Plaintiff in SAS properly negotiated contractual restric-
tions in the licensing agreement before distributing the source. The license
agreement permitted defendant to modify plaintiff's program, but only for its
own use. 189 It further provided that "no redistribution of such an updated work
was allowed." 190 The SAS case could have easily been decided under contract
law. As the court noted, "This case primarily involves a license agreement be-
tween the [plaintiff] and [defendant]." 19 1 Defendant S & H breached an express
term of the licensing agreement.
In Whelan defendant also obtained access to plaintiff's source code, which
he used extensively in developing a microcomputer version of plaintiff's pro-
gram, 192 but plaintiff had no contractual protection. Under the parties' only
contractual arrangement, defendant Jaslow agreed to use its "best efforts to act
diligently in the marketing of the Dentalab package," and plaintiff Whelan
agreed to use its "best efforts and to act diligently to improve and augment the
previously successfully designed Dentalab package."19 3 Marketing software
does not require having access to the source code, but only the object code.
Under a marketplace analysis the burden is on the software owner to have ap-
function of a particular section of code. Disassembly of object code is often accomplished for pur-
poses such as 1) overriding copy protection or encryption schemes; 2) gaining a glimpse at a particu-
lar file structure so that the new program could interface with an existing program; or 3) getting a
look at the "idea" behind a particular procedure or function and then subsequently writing one's
own code to accomplish the same end.
A competitor does not significantly curtail a first developer's lead time by disassembling code
unless large chunks of the code are literally copied or translated and inserted into the competitor's
program. If a competitor makes verbatim or literal copies or translations of sections of the disassem-
bled code, then an action for federal misappropriation would be available.
Copyright law treats disassembly in much the same way. It prevents a competitor from making
literal copies of the disassembled code. Copyright law in certain instances permits reverse engineer-
ing or disassembly under its fair use defense: "For copyrighted works, including programs, fair use
analysis applies. If reverse engineering, in the software context, means observing how a program
works, and then writing an original program to accomplish the same ends, then it is probably per-
missible." Baumgarten & Meyer, Program Copyright and the Office of Technology Assessment (part
2), COMPUTER LAW., Nov. 1987, at 6-7. As one court recognized:
The mere fact that defendant's engineers dumped, flow charted, and analyzed plaintiff's
work does not, in and of itself, establish pirating.... Had [defendant] contented itself with
surveying the general outline of the [plaintiff's] program, thereafter converting the scheme
into detailed code through its own imagination, creativity, and independent thought, a
claim of infringement would not have arisen.... While defendant may have permissibly
dumped, flow charted, and analyzed plaintiff's code, it could not permissibly copy it.
E.F. Johnson Co. v. Uniden Corp. of Am., 623 F. Supp. 1485, 1501 n.17 (D. Minn. 1985). The E.F.
Johnson court found iterative or verbatim reproduction of data tables and 38 of 44 subroutines.
Defendants had reverse engineered plaintiff's object code program. Id. at 1497 n.10. See Hazen,
supra note 132, at 124-25; see Brooks, Reverse-Engineering Computer Software: Is It Fair Use or
Plagiarism? COMPUTER LAW INSTITUTE 799 (1986); see also Appendix.
189. SAS, 605 F. Supp. at 821.
190. Id.
191. Id. at 819.
192. See Whelan Assocs. v. Jaslow Dental Laboratories, 797 F.2d 1222, 1232 n.22 (3d Cir. 1986)
(defendant Jaslow had "surreptitiously and without consent [of plaintiff] obtained a copy of the
[Dentalab] source code"), cert. denied, 107 S. Ct. 877 (1987).
193. Id. at 1226.
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propriate contractual restrictions before source code is unveiled to any non-
owner. Under the facts in Whelan, however, defendant Jaslow wrongfully took
the source code from plaintiff without permission; therefore, plaintiff would have
an action against defendant for federal misappropriation or conversion. An ac-
tion for federal misappropriation would be available because plaintiff's distribu-
tion of its source code was unintentional.
A prudent software owner having a close business relationship with an em-
ployee or with a person responsible for marketing should take precautions by
negotiating contractual restrictions including a nondisclosure provision or a rea-
sonable covenant not to compete. 194 One advantage of the marketplace ap-
proach is that the parties can negotiate a variety of protective provisions. If the
parties had defined the scope of protection in a contract the Whelan case would
have been easily resolved.
III. CONCLUSION
Protection of property is fundamental for the survival of a market economy.
Absent protection, members of society would lack the incentive to create or to
preserve valuable property. Since the 1970s, when computer software became
increasingly valuable, the legal system has struggled with which form of protec-
tion best serves society. Protection for this evolving form of property initially
was problematic because no one knew how computer software should be catego-
rized and defined. After years of debate, the bulk of protection for computer
software resides in the copyright domain. Copyright law was originally estab-
lished to protect words that were placed on paper and subsequently perceived by
the human senses. Other forms of intellectual property, such as paintings and
audiovisual displays, were added later to the copyright scheme, but the primary
function of these works was to stimulate and communicate with human senses.
Although computer software is perceived by machines rather than humans,
the introduction of software to copyright law seemed to work wel at the outset.
Early cases involved the literal, line-by-line copying of the program code, which
was then sold for profit at relatively little cost to the infringer. Disallowing pro-
tection in these cases would have been devastating to the competitive process
because the economic incentive needed to stimulate innovation and creativity in
the computer software industry would have vanished. Later courts granted pro-
tection to the organization and structure of software to reach equitable results,
and in doing so crossed the idea-expression threshold.
Recent cases extended copyright protection to the literal elements of the
user interface of software. Audiovisual copyright has been expanded from a
means of protection for fanciful creations in entertainment software to the pro-
tection of the user interface of productivity software. Although the concept of
derivative work has not yet been used by a court to prohibit copying of the user
194. See Plain's Cotton Coop. Ass'n v. Goodpasture Computer Serv., 807 F.2d 1256, 1258 (5th
Cir.) (defendants, former employees of plaintiff, left plaintiff company with a copy of the source code
that they developed while in scope of employment; none of the employees had been required to sign
confidentiality agreements as a condition of employment), cert. denied, 108 S. Ct. 80 (1987).
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interface, its far-reaching potential renders it a time bomb. Further, the concept
of compilation has been extended from prohibiting free-riders in a noncomputer
context to precluding legitimate software competitors. As a result of this ad hoc
application of the copyright law, one is no longer free to create software that will
duplicate the end result of another copyrighted program. This protection far
exceeds that which is needed to provide an incentive to create.
This Comment recommends a marketplace approach to software protection
using contract law as the foundation. The burden of protection would shift to
software developers and the scope of protection would be negotiable. The
scheme would protect both the idea and the expression, but the monopoly dura-
tion would be limited to a first developer's lead time. Further, Congress should
adopt a federal law of misappropriation. Based on the classic decision in Inter-
national News Service that persons should not be able to "reap where they have
not sown," this specific scheme protects a first developer's lead time and encour-
ages the marketplace to rely on contract law as its protective device.
This new scheme of protection would provide economic reward for a lim-
ited time of a value commensurate with the creativity involved as measured by
the product's usefulness to society. Moreover, this plan promotes further inno-
vation and competition. Realizing that competition will soon follow, first devel-
opers would no longer rest on the economic success of their products, but would
continually develop new software to stay on top of the marketplace. Finally,
this system falls squarely within the guideline set forth in the U.S. Constitution
because it promotes "the Progress of Science and useful Arts, by securing for
limited Times to [programmers] the exclusive Right to their respective Writings
and Discoveries." 195
VANCE FRANKLIN BROWN
195. U.S. CONST., art. I, § 8, cl. 8.
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APPENDIX
VARIOUS STAGES OF A COMPUTER PROGRAM
I English I
Algorithm
V
I Source Code I
(Pascal)
V
Assembler
V
IObject Code
A progaimer first identifies a problem and composes a solution in an Eng-
lish algoritmformat. The algorithmf is then used as a guide by the programmer
to create the progam in a igh level source code language (such as Pascal).
Next, the compliter automatically translates the program into object code.
There is an intermediate stage recognized~ b~etween source code andl qbject code
known as assembler. Programmers can initially write assembler mn lieu of the
high level language, but assembler level of code requires much more detail from
the programmer.
coeThe computer can automatically reverse en * er(or disassemble) obNject
coeinto assemibler language. However, under te existing state of technorog
computers cannot recreatethigh level source from object code. The generate
assemnbler code is slightly more comprehensible than the "I"s and "O"s of object
code, but is much less understandable than high level source.
Each of the four stages, of a program, are demonstrated below. The purpose
of the program used for this demonstration is to generate a list of primie num-
bers. The program was written by the author, taken through the steps, and then
reverse engineered.
ENGLISH ALGORITHM
(To Generate Prime Numbers)
STEP 1: Start with a prime number candidate of 2.
STEP 2: Process until the requested number of primes is found.
STEP 3: Start with a divisor of 2.
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STEP 4: Process until the divisor is determined to be evenly divisible or until
the divisor reaches the candidate.
STEP 5: Check this divisor and then loop back to STEP 4.
STEP 6: If the divisor was evenly divisible then display the candidate as a
prime number.
STEP 7: Proceed to the next candidate and loop back to STEP 2.
SOURCE CODE
(Pascal Programming Language)
Program PrimeNum (Input, Output);
* ** * **** ** *** *** *** ** *** ** * ** *** ** ** ** *
* WRITTEN BY: Vance F. Brown *
* DATE: April 5, 1988 *
* PROGRAM PURPOSE: This program allows user to enter the *
* desired number of prime numbers to be ascertained. The *
* program then lists the prime numbers (starting with the prime *
* number 2) in numerical order in five columns. *
* DEFINITION OF PRIME NUMBER: A number is prime if it is not *
* evenly divisible by any number other than itself and 1. *
Var [for variable function explanation, see below)
num, count, primes, times, divisor: Integer; check: Boolean;
Begin [of program]
[***** initialize variables *****j
num :=2; [the prime number candidate]
count := 0; [number of prime numbers found)
times := 0; [number of columns before a carriage return)
[***** ask user how many prime numbers to list *****j
write ('How many prime numbers do you want to find? ');
read (primes);
writeln;
writeln; [carriage returns
writeln;
repeat [until the number of primes is found]
check := false; [initialize: assume first that number is not
prime]
divisor := 2; [first number to be divided into candidate]
divisor := succ(divisor); [first number to be divided into candidate]
[***** loop to determine if number is prime *****)
while (divisor < num) and (not check) do begin
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check := num mod divisor = 0; [the remainder after dividing divisor
into num}
divisor := succ(divisor); [increment divisor}
end; [of while loop}
[***** if a prime number, then display it *
If not check then begin
write (num:10);
count := succ(count); [increment number of
times := succ(times);
primes
found)
[increment column number)
[***** column adjustment, once five numbers displayed, carriage
return *****}
if times = 5 then begin
writeln; [carriage return}
times := 0; [start counter for column number over}
end; [of column adjustment if statement)]
end; [of display of if prime number statement)
num := succ(num); [next candidate for prime number)
until count = primes; [once the number of primes entered by user is
found, the program ends]
end. [of program)
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OBJECT CODE
11101001 01111001 00101100 10010000 10010000 11001101 10101011
01000011 01101111 01110000 01111001 01110010 01101001 01100111
01101000 01110100 00100000 00101000 01000011 00101001 00100000
00110001 00111001 00111000 00110101 00100000 01000010 01001111
01010010 01001100 01000001 01001110 01000100 00100000 01001001
01101110 01100011 00000010 00000100 00000000 10110001 01010111
00000000 00111100 00110011 00000000 00000000 00000000 00000000
00000000 00000000 00000000 00000000 00000000 00000000 00000000
00000000 00000000 00000000 00000000 00000000 00 00000000
00000000 00000000 00000000 00000000 00000000 00000000 00000000
00000000 00000000 00000000 00000000 00000000 00000000 00000000
00000000 00000000 00000000 00000000 00000000 00000000 00000000
00000000 00010100 01000100 01100101 01100110 01100001 01110101
01101100 01110100 00100000 01100100 01101001 01110011 01110000
01101100 01100001 01111001 00100000 01101101 01101111 01100100
01100101 01010000 00011001 00000001 11111111 11111111 00001111
00000111 00000111 01110000 00001111 00000111 00000111 01110000
00001110 00000111 00000111 01001111 00101110 10001010 00100111
00001010 11100100 11111001 01110100 00001110 01000011 00101110
10001010 00000111 01010000 11101000 11011000 00001000 01011000
11111110 11001100 01110101 11110011 11111000 11000011 01111010
00000000 11111111 01111011 00001000 00000000 00011111 11000111
00000110 00010010 00000000 01101110 00000000 00101110 11000110
00000110 10010100 00000001 00000000 10111110 00100000 00000000
The above object code is only the first 24 of 1,674 printed lines of the prime
number program.
REVERSE ENGINEERED ASSEMBLER
L05CF: PUSH AX ;05CF 50
PUSH CX ;05DO 51
MOV CL,4 ;05D1 Bi 04
SHR AXCL ;05D3 D3 E8
ADD BXAX ;05D5 03 D8
POP CX ;05D7 59
POP AX ;05D8 58
AND AXOF ;05D9 25 OF 00
RETNEAR ;05DC C3
;L05DD L062A CC
L05DD: CMP BX,DX ;05DD 3B DA
JNZ L05E3 ;05DF 75 02
CMP AX,CX ;05El 3B C1
L05E3 L05DF CJ
L05E3: RETNEAR ;05E3 C3
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L05E4: ADD
ADD
iMP
AX,CX
BX,CX
SHORTL05CF
;L05E4
;05E4
;05E6
;05E8
L05EA
L0656 CC
03 C1
03 DA
EB E5
L0625 CC
L05EA: MOV AX,ES:[DI+4] ;05EA 26 8B 45 04
MOV BX,ES:[DI+6] ;05EE 26 8B 5D 06
PUSH AX ;05F2 50
OR AX,BX ;05F3 OB C3
POP AX ;05F5 58
RETNEAR ;05F6 C3
The above reverse engineered assembler code is an excerpt of 29 out of
7,330 total lines. This code was automatically generated from the prime number
program object code. Using this code to reconstruct the original 66-line high
level Pascal source would take much longer than it originally took to write the
high level program.
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